tivities, especially since the peacekeeper invariably sees the local culture at its worst. These skills are required by ordinary soldiers as well as by officers, given that even soldiers are called upon to defuse local, often seemingly trivial, incidents that could escalate into major ones.⁸³

Peacekeepers have not always acted perfectly, but in view of the limited education of most soldiers, the record of peacekeepers' widespread success at mediation and cooperative endeavors with local populations is remarkable. This is probably due to the sense of commitment the peacekeeping function inspires in soldiers whose principal training emphasizes uglier tasks. Many peacekeeping nations provide pre-departure training programs for soldiers, policemen, and civilian experts participating in UN operations. For example, the Austrian centre aims, not merely to inform, but to "create an understanding, acceptance, and tolerance of the situation in which they will be involved."⁸⁴

The relative success of this form of North-South collaboration, in comparison with the widespread failure of technical cooperation, for example, may say something about the importance in all N-S collaborations of commitment and teamwork, of clear mission objectives, responsibilities, and logistics, and of a lesser lifestyle gap between the northern and southern parties. These things are no doubt more easily achieved in the more hierarchical military situation, but aid agencies and businesses could probably learn a few things from the example of peacekeeping forces. There are areas where improvements can be made in peacekeeping operations too. For example, after a Canadian peacekeeping unit killed Somalian civilians in 1993, a special inquiry into the affair recommended that

^{83.} Fursdon, Edward, "UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus," Conflict Studies, No. 232, p. 16.

^{84.} Hessel, Friedrich, "Experience Gained in Leading and Training of UN Troops," *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, May/June 1991, p. 3.