

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

that is a ridiculously small sum -- some 15 per cent of what they really spend -- for the declared defence budget of a State regarded as a military super-Power. It bears no relationship at all to the \$250 billion figure I mentioned a moment ago, which suggests what it would cost the United States to mount an effort equivalent to the present Soviet defence effort. There is no way in the world that the Soviet Union could be mounting its current defence effort on a declared budget of 20.3 billion roubles. It is spending many, many, many times that, and we all know that.

Or again, take the public statements of the two sides on the issue of strategic defences. The United States Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), of which you have heard some, I am sure, in this room, is an openly declared programme. Its budget is published and voted on by the United States Congress. Its activities are reported to the Congress, where it is widely discussed and debated. The President of the United States often discusses the programme in his speeches. In fact I have personally found it hard to stop him from discussing the subject of SDI at any time, in his speeches or otherwise.

Yet to this day, even as we negotiate on defence and space issues with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues to deny that it has the equivalent of an SDI programme of its own. We know this denial to be false. I believe everybody in this room knows the denial to be false. We know that the Soviet Union began investigating several advanced strategic defence technologies before we did, years before. We know it is extensively engaged in exploration and development of these technologies. We know, for example, that the Soviet Union has an extensive laser research programme which involves about 10,000 scientists and expenditure of resources worth approximately \$1 billion a year just on that kind of laser research programme. And we know it is researching a host of other technologies, advanced technologies, as well.

Can it surprise anyone that our progress in arms control is often slow and halting when there is such a lack of openness and honesty between Governments about even such an elementary fact as this one?

There is, in short, almost no area of arms control in which greater openness would not lead to greater openness on the way to greater progress. In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to a meaningful agreement. Thus, my message to you today can be summed up as this: unless the Soviet Union moves to the openness it now talks about, accomplishments in arms control are just going to be limited, if not thwarted altogether. That movement towards greater openness is necessary for progress on an issue like the one this Conference has before it.