

1000 American tactical nuclear warheads, 36 Pershing launchers and 54 F-4s. The Warsaw Treaty Organization proposal was rejected, primarily because of the "data problem".

In December of 1979 NATO presented a new, simplified proposal to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In the first phase, it called for the withdrawal of 30,000 Soviet ground personnel (three divisions) and 13,000 American ground personnel. The offer of tactical nuclear weapon trade-offs (the so-called "option III") was removed from the proposal as a consequence of the NATO decision to modernize theatre nuclear weapons and the earlier American decision to remove unilaterally 1,000 obsolete tactical nuclear-weapon warheads. In a sense, the American unilateral move countered the previous "unilateral removal" of 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks by the Soviet Union. The new proposal stipulated that no withdrawals could occur until the two sides had agreed on a common data base for ground-based personnel. Only after the first phase had been completed would the more difficult second phase dealing with indigenous forces and armaments levels begin. The proposal also required that both sides agree to implement extensive Confidence-Building Measures (Associated Measures) to assist in monitoring troop movements and ceilings. The Soviet Union was concerned that the second phase of negotiations might never be completed (depriving them of the opportunity of reducing West German military strength) and was equally unhappy with Western demands that the data problem be resolved. Warsaw Treaty Organization complaints also included the unnecessarily intrusive nature of the Associated Measures (including their extension beyond the original reduction zone into the European portion of the USSR).

The Warsaw Treaty Organization made a counter-proposal in July of 1980 built around the unilateral Soviet withdrawal of forces already undertaken. It called for the withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet and 13,000 American troops and a limitation prohibiting any single country from deploying more than half the total of ground and air personnel in the reduction zone. This was obviously directed at West Germany. This proposal also came aground on the data problem. The WTO advanced a modification in November of 1980 that called for a freeze on forces between the first (largely symbolic) and second (more substantive) phase of reduc-

tions. This proposal was also confounded by disagreements over force sizes and the lack of a common data base.

Since then, the two sides have developed and promoted their own versions of draft agreements – a Warsaw Treaty Organization draft was presented on February 18, 1982, and a NATO draft on July 8, 1982. The Warsaw Treaty Organization has also revised its position on on-site inspection (beginning in June of 1983) with the Soviet Union discussing, in principle at least, the use of on-site inspectors at troop exit points. However, no specific details about such procedures have yet been discussed formally.

The negotiations were adjourned December 15, 1983, with a date for resumption having been agreed to (a Soviet reaction to the NATO decision to proceed with intermediate force modernization). However, after a three-month delay, the talks resumed again on March 16. On April 18, 1984, after difficult intra-alliance negotiations, NATO made an effort to circumvent the increasingly difficult problem of common troop figures. Largely as a result of American pressure, a suggestion was advanced for counting combat and combat-support units rather than individual soldiers of all types, at least during the first stage of withdrawal. The proposal also speaks of agreement on figures "within a certain range of uncertainty", suggesting that a degree of variation in estimates is tolerable. Some other NATO states (predominantly Germany) had pressed for a more flexible negotiating position. It is very difficult to see what type of solution to this exceptionally difficult "counting problem" would be mutually satisfactory.

Despite the difficult problems and leisurely progress of the MBFR negotiations, a fair amount of common ground exists. For instance, the two sides seem prepared to accept a collective 700,000-man ground force ceiling for each alliance, an initial U.S.-Soviet reduction followed by a more extensive and detailed indigenous force reduction (perhaps associated with a freeze on force size and equipment during negotiations) and the use of relatively extensive Confidence-Building Measures (Associated Measures) to ensure compliance and reduce surprise attack fears. Both sides have agreed not to re-deploy in a threatening man-

