

the remarkable ability which it displays. The subject is grasped by such a comprehensive mode of treatment, and so lucidly discussed, and so agreeably and pointedly illustrated by a vast variety of anecdotes that have been collected by him from the lips of able American cavalry officers, whose experience would supply materials for volumes, that we hardly know which to admire most. "the matter" or "the manner of his speech." His style is singularly clear and trenchant, and his work, though dealing with some dry details, is so agreeably written that a boarding-school miss could read it with as much interest if not with as much benefit as a field officer. The scope of the work can be best indicated by giving the subjects treated of *seriatim*, by the author:—"Characteristics of Cavalry," "Organization," "The Comparative Merits of the different Arms," "Arms of Cavalry and Dragoons," "Dress of Cavalry," "The Horse and his Equipment," "Formation of Cavalry and Elementary Drill," "Morale," "Cavalry Tactics," "Cavalry against Cavalry," "Cavalry against Infantry," "Outposts and Patrols," "Advanced and Rear Guards," "Reconnoitring," "Intelligence," "Marches," "Camps," "Supplies," "Passage of Defiles and Rivers," "Surprises and Ambuscades," "Convoys," "Flags of Truce." The author has also appended a description, supplied to him by Colonel Jenyns, V. C., commander of the 13th Hussars, of his system of non-pivot drill; most interesting and valuable letters received from General Fitzhugh Lee, General Stephen D. Lee, General Thomas L. Rosser, and from a General officer in the late Confederate service, on the saddle and the revolver. This work treats of a subject of no mere literary or historical interest to the people of the Dominion. We are expending, or are about to expend, some millions of dollars on defences, and in organizing an army, and it is of vital importance that it should be made as effective as possible, otherwise we are simply investing our millions in some future Bull's Run, and converting our militia grant into a *butchery fund*. Though the Fenian Raid and our disasters at Ridgway, and nearly at every point where we met the enemy, must be causes of serious misgivings as to

the future, and of regret for the past, it is at least satisfactory to know that there were some incidents which we can recall with no little satisfaction.

The author of this work, with his little mounted force, made a dash upon Fort Erie and captured the few prisoners whom we secured, while he released some of our own men who had been taken by the enemy. We have seen a history of that campaign from the pen of Colonel Denison, which is considered the best which has yet appeared. But such a publication is of a comparatively limited range, and must necessarily be far inferior in importance and general interest to the work which we are now discussing. We feel the less hesitation in speaking as we do of a Canadian soldier, as we are warranted by the opinions expressed by two of the ablest officers in the British army, one of whom, well known for his gallantry as well as by his being a thorough master of his profession, has declared that there are only one or two men in Her Majesty's service that can compare with Colonel Denison in his knowledge of cavalry tactics. This encomium will find no little warrant in the work before us, which has since appeared from the pen of Colonel Denison. To the most superficial reader its importance is palpable, as it points out in a clear practical way a system of organizing a force to which we are inclined to assign fully as much importance as is attached to it by the author.

We must have a force that can *move rapidly* from point to point, and can attack stockades, charge disorderly marauders, or defend themselves behind breastworks against superior forces. How can we organize such a body? By combining the rifleman and the mounted soldier. We must adapt our forces to our country, and learn a lesson from the Cossacks of the Don, and from Mosby's troopers. We believe that, if Colonel Denison's views are adopted, we could organize a *corps* that would not be long in active service on the frontier before "the blue bonnets" would be "over the border" in a country where a raid would be far easier and far more tempting than anything of the sort which we could offer to our neighbors. We feel that our readers will prefer Colonel Deni-