sufficiency of such notice, and that the defendants have not thereby been prejudiced in their defence."

These enactments, which, like many others, derogate from the good old common law rule that suffered no wrong to be without a remedy, may perhaps be capable of justification, but what excuse can be offered for the recent unreasonable abridgment of the rights of individuals effected by 59 Vict., ch. 51, sec. 20? Under this latest amendment the notice must be given within seven days, when the action is against a city, town or incorporated village, and the saving clause allowing the court or judge in a proper case to dispense with the notice is repealed.

Not infrequently does it happen that in such cases the injured party is rendered insensible for a considerable length of time, or prevented by physical suffering from giving a thought to the question of recovering from the corporation, or perchance he may be lying without friends in some public hospital. Under such or similar circumstances it would indeed be a remarkable thing if an ordinary layman, even if he had heard of this vicious statutory provision, should take steps to comply with it. Great injustice is likely to result from this extraordinary legislation; it practically takes away in many cases the right of action altogether.

Perhaps the severest censure on the present state of the law lies in the fact that when the time for giving the notice was thirty days, the legislature recognized that cases would arise in which a reasonable excuse might be offered for non-delivery of the notice within the prescribed time, and provided for such cases, whereas now the time is less than one-quarter of what it then was, and the equitable provision, to which reference has been made, has been eliminated, leaving no discretion in the courts to relieve against the rigor of the enactment under any circumstances. This matter should receive attention at the hands of the Attorney-General next session.