

fully independent of all interests in the choice and performance of duties—the best instruction would not necessarily have any influence upon one's performance of duty. But very few persons, if any, believe that to be the case. While the will enjoys freedom of choice, this freedom is not absolute, but is limited to the desires that have been awakened. Of conflicting desires it is possible for the will to choose those of the higher order. The relative intensity of these desires is, however, certainly a factor in this choice. Now since the scope, quality, and intensity of desire may be greatly affected by instruction, it is possible for the educator to exert a marked influence upon the will, and hence upon character. The ideal character is approached as the friction between desire and actual duty is diminished; and the school, in awakening right desires through interest, is causing such an approach. It is true that history furnishes abundant supposed examples of duty and interest in direct conflict with each other. The monks of the Middle Ages scourged themselves and underwent innumerable tortures in order to subject interest and desire to duty. But in so doing they were still following desire, for it was in the hope of escaping future punishment and enjoying eternal bliss that they subjected themselves to such barbarous treatment. Their fear on the one hand, and their hope or desire on the other, being intense, their volition and conduct were greatly affected.

Just how school instruction can through interest engender a sense of duty may be plainly seen if a concrete example is taken. The study of Washington at Valley Forge acquaints the scholar with a remarkable instance of perseverance. Knowledge of the facts, if approached rightly and comprehended clearly, awakens a feeling of

interest in the man that amounts even to admiration. But we are so constituted that, with the admiration for moral qualities, comes the demand that we exhibit such qualities ourselves. In this case, then, we are made to feel under obligations to be more persevering. Perhaps we have had that feeling before, but now it is repeated. In this way instruction can, by arousing genuine interest, give exercise in the feeling of obligation to do right; that means the development of a sense of duty. The study of the great men in history and of the ideals of literature is continually furnishing practice for the feeling of approval or condemnation, and the accompanying one of obligation to imitate or shun the same kind of action. The sense of duty is, therefore, not only not opposed to interest, but it is developed through interest.

In spite of the argument just presented the suspicion is likely to be harbored that, to the extent that one is guided by his interest, he is threatened with selfishness. In this connection it is necessary to call to mind the fact that there are two kinds of interest; each awakens desires, but the one, being unselfish, is the source of unselfish desires, while the other, centering the attention upon self, leads to selfish longings.

The student devoted to science, first of all for its own sake, rather than owing to any particular advantage it may bring, furnishes an example of the former kind; he who, like the Jesuit scholar, is interested in study with the primary object of surpassing rivals and of winning a prize, affords an example of the latter sort. It is scarcely necessary to remark that it is mainly the former that should be cultivated. When the thing contemplated is right in itself and the interest is direct, it is not likely that selfish desires will result. The philanthro-