

dence as to Seneca's Writings and Paul's," for proof that well-attested books of the Bible are pronounced spurious by critics, who admit without hesitation the genuineness of books ascribed to profane authors which have not a tithe of the same evidence in their favor.

(6) "The argument from silence is often of great value."

The fallacies that arrange themselves under this head are enormous. A large proportion of the difficulties and objections alleged by the critics are drawn from what the sacred writers do not say, and are perfectly gratuitous, whether as inferring ignorance on their part, or justifying the imputation to them of sentiments which they do not express. It is impossible at the close of this article to enumerate or even to classify them.

Other fallacies of frequent occurrence can only be hinted at here without enlarging upon them. One is the fallacy of the circle, assuming the point to be proved. It is thus with the alleged characteristics of the so-called Pentateuchal documents. Certain words are held to characterize JE, and certain other words to characterize P. Every passage containing any of the former class of words is unhesitatingly ascribed to JE, and every passage containing any of the latter class is in like manner assigned to P. And the result is just what might be anticipated: the JE words are all found in the JE sections, and the P words in the P sections, for the simple reason that the critics have put them there. The division was made on this basis.

Euclid tells us that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. The critics have improved upon this axiom. They act on the assumption that things which are not equal to the same thing are equal to one another. This is the foundation of their so-called parallel passages, of which they make such extensive use in impugning the historicity of the Pentateuch. Two distinct narratives, having certain points in common, are on this account declared to be separate accounts of the same transaction. Their differences are then adduced to prove, not what they do in fact establish, that the two transactions are not in fact identical, but that the two accounts of the same thing, as they are gratuitously assumed to be, are conflicting and irreconcilable, and therefore untrustworthy.

Euclid again teaches us that a whole is equal to the sum of all its parts. But the critics improve on this axiom likewise, and act on the assumption that any one of the parts is equal to the whole or equal to any other part. This is the foundation of the doublets, which Wellhausen and Dillmann have multiplied so profusely. Any transaction involving two or more particulars may by this process be parceled between two or more documents, the portion assigned to each one severally being gratuitously assumed to be a separate account of the whole matter. These separate accounts are then compared, and as of course they do not correspond, being quite distinct, the untrustworthiness of the narrative is inferred.