man going overseas, so long as, in the statutes of Canada, any restriction remains it will continue to be cited as a bar to a total effort, and a bar, moreover, which finds its expression in the law of our land.

We have been released by the plebiscite from commitments which, up to the time of the plebiscite, had been pointed to as the bar to an all-out effort. Surely, every argument that could be urged in support of a release from a moral obligation, can be urged with equal force against a legal obligation, the effect of which, in so far as it may constitute a bar to a total effort, is exactly the same. If there be any wisdom in removing false impressions, surely the sooner they are removed the better.

Why not proceed by stages?

It will be said that it may be perfectly true that there is need for some action as a consequence of the plebiscite, and need even for immediate action. But why, it is asked, go so far? Why seek to do everything at once? Why not proceed by stages? The people need educating. What they may not see to-day, they may come to understand to-morrow. It was difficult enough, in some quarters, to have them see the wisdom of trusting the government, and of giving to it, subject to its responsibility to parliament, a free hand at a time of war. Why arouse suspicions? Above all, why give to those who said that the plebiscite was a mere subterfuge and that its real purpose was the immediate application of conscription for service overseas, the chance to say "we told you so; we are the real leaders; the rest have been deceiving you". Why should those who spoke otherwise be placed in a false light by the introduction of a measure containing the principle of compulsory military service for overseas, and that, as my former colleague said: "just a few days after the vote"?

These are pertinent questions. They are questions to the significance of which too careful attention cannot be paid by members of parliament, and, I might add, by all who have to do with the moulding of public opinion in Canada. They may seem difficult questions to answer, but if they cannot be answered, and answered to the satisfaction of an impartial listener, then I am prepared to say that I would be unworthy of the confidence placed in myself, and the government would be unworthy of the support it has received from those who so loyally supported us in our effort

to obtain an affirmative vote on the plebiscite.

Let me first of all refer to what some would have regarded as a preferable way of proceeding. I do not think I need to say more about the mistake it would have been for the

government, once the moral restriction was removed, to have delayed in seeking the removal of the legal restriction.

But, it is said, could not the removal of the legal restriction have been effected by two or more steps, instead of one? It has, for example, been said that if, in due course, the government had brought in an amendment which would have substituted "the northern half of the western hemisphere", or, for that matter, "the western hemisphere", for the words "Canada and the territorial waters thereof", where the latter words appear in section 3 of the mobilization act that in all probability such an amendment would have encountered little, if any, opposition.

That, I believe is true. As long ago as February 26, I stated that the government would, if necessary, not hesitate to use the War Measures Act to send troops called up under the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, to "the panhandle or any place in the vicinity of the coast of Canada". No exception was taken to that statement at the time it was made, nor am I aware of any having been taken since. It is probably now apparent why, in speaking at the time, I related that possible action particularly to Alaska.

Procedure by stages not in accord with purpose of plebiscite

The question is: Would such an amendment have served to meet the purposes of the plebiscite as they were outlined in the speech from the throne? Would it have removed from clause 3 of the mobilization act everything that could be construed as a legal limitation upon Canada's war effort? Would it have given the government freedom of action? Would it not rather have been construed, by those who wished so to misrepresent the government's purpose and intention, as the substitution of another limitation for the one removed? Would this new legal limitation, just as has been the case with the existing one, not have continued to be pointed to as a restriction upon a total or utmost effort?

But that is not the only objection to proceeding by stages. To amend the act, in any particular, means a debate in both houses of parliament. It means a debate which, whatever the amendment proposed, would be a debate on the question of conscription. Should a second or third amendment become necessary later on, it would certainly mean as many subsequent debates, going over all the same ground again. Unnecessary discussion and prolonged debate in parliament at a time when our country is hourly being drawn into greater danger would not serve to place Canada's war effort in its true light, either

before our own people or before the people of other countries, nor would it gain respect for parliament.

This brings me to a further reason why I feel the government is right in seeking, once and for all, to secure complete freedom to exercise its best judgment in dealing with every situation in the light of what is best for Canada and for Canada's effort in the present war, and that events will so prove.

In concluding my first appeal for an affirmative vote on the plebiscite, I said:

Aggression has followed aggression with such speed in so many parts of the world that no one can now predict what new areas the war may reach next year, next month, or next week. Danger threatens us from the east and from the west. It is in the face of this peril that, for the defence of our freedom and of our country, the government asks you to give it a free hand.

For the same reason, we now ask the same from parliament.

I take no exception to the statement made by my former colleague in his letter of resignation when he says:

As far as Canada is concerned, since the question of the plebiscite was first discussed, and since the vote has been taken, nothing has been said nor anything established to indicate that the war situation has rendered necessary just a few days after the vote, the introduction of a measure containing the principle of compulsory military service for overseas.

Were the element of surprise not an outstanding feature of enemy strategy; and were it not a fact that no one knows at what moment the war situation may take some wholly unexpected turn, there would be, at the present time, no practical need for the introduction of an amendment which contains the principle of compulsory military service for overseas. It is always well, however, to be prepared as far in advance as may be possible for any contingency.

If the reasons for having introduced the proposed amendment, just a few days after the vote on the plebiscite, were solely those of meeting some new war situation, or a war situation other than was envisaged when the question of the plebiscite was first discussed, I would be the first to say that such reasons were wholly insufficient to justify the deletion of clause 3 in its entirety at the present time. But such, as I have explained, are not the reasons either for the amendment being introduced so soon after the taking of the plebiscite, or for the government seeking, at the present time, to have the whole of section 3 deleted.

Responsibility to Parliament

Up to the present, I have said nothing of the powers which, under the War Measures Act, the governor in council already possesses. Under that act, as interpreted by judicial decision and by the legal advisers of the government, the governor in council has authority, notwithstanding section 3, to send men enlisted under the National Resources Mobilization Act to points outside the boundaries of Canada and the territorial waters thereof. In other words, if, to-day, in the opinion of the government, the war situation demanded the dispatch overseas of men already called up under compulsion for military service, the government has the necessary legal power to order their dispatch.

Why then, it will be asked, does the government come to parliament for powers which it already possesses? The answer to this question is the sense the executive has of its responsibility to parliament.

To defeat the enemy overseas, and thereby lessen the possibility of the actual invasion of Canada itself, is the objective of Canada's armed forces overseas, whether they be upon the sea, in the air, or on land.

The government does not believe that, to serve that end, conscription for overseas service is necessary at the present time. Moreover, it may never become necessary. But, in case it should ever become necessary, it is surely the part of wisdom that there should be no doubt whatever of the power of the government to take the necessary action the moment the necessity to do so may arise. There should equally be no doubt that this power is derived from the present parliament rather than from a statute enacted in 1914.

No change of government policy

There is nothing in the proposed amendment which could imply that the government's attitude towards conscription for service overseas, as set forth in parliament and as expressed from time to time in the plebiscite campaign, has been altered in the least, or that there is any intention of a change of government policy or attitude. The government's policy as to being given complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise was clearly stated in the speech from the throne at the opening of parliament in the following words:

My advisers believe that the magnitude and balanced nature of Canada's war effort is being obscured and impaired by controversy concerning commitments with respect to the methods of raising men for military service which were made prior to the spread of the war to all parts of the world.

The government is of the opinion that, at this time of gravest crisis in the world's history, the administration, subject only to its responsibility to parliament, should in this connection and irrespective of any previous commitments, possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise.