

agreements is due to expire before 1967, so that we have no ready-made opportunity to take up this matter with our bilateral partners. It is most unlikely that the Canadian uranium industry would welcome the use of the Agency as a broker.

4. The first proposal — that we should accept to apply Agency procedures as set out in the safeguards document — would presumably cause us no particular difficulty, since the procedures are no more rigorous than those we already observe.

5. The fourth point — opening of Canadian facilities to Agency inspection — would cause more difficulty. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited does not consider that the NRX and NRU reactors at Chalk River could be opened to Agency inspection as long as they are selling plutonium to the United States and the United Kingdom. Selective opening of facilities at Chalk River or in other parts of Canada would they consider, and I am inclined to agree, carry little if any moral weight. They would however be prepared to discuss the question if this Department felt strongly upon the matter.

6. The present outlook for safeguards is not particularly hopeful. The Soviet bloc and India will apparently hold firmly to their position and may well attract support from a number of the underdeveloped countries; France has indicated that it will not oppose but will equally not be an active supporter; Australia and South Africa at the last Board of Governors meeting both indicated that they were under some strain in continuing their support, and both have reserved their position on their bilateral agreements. Nevertheless, it seems that Canada should now cooperate with the United States and the United Kingdom in making all possible efforts to secure a definitively favourable reception of safeguards by the Fourth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency and that we should actively consider whether we are prepared to adopt any of the “collateral action” described above. Points 1 and 3 in particular should be examined. If the attempt to carry safeguards fails, as it well may, we shall of course have to review our position on the matter as a whole.

7. You may wish to suggest to Mr. Bryce that the Atomic Energy Advisory Panel might discuss this question before Ministers are asked to approve the delegation’s instructions for the General Conference. Mr. Wershof, who is on home leave, would be available to attend a meeting of the Panel August 10-11.⁵

O.G. STONER

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*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, August 19, 1960

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: SAFEGUARDS

I should like to mention for your consideration now two matters connected with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) proposals for safeguards which will have to be dealt with well before the General Conference opens on September 20.

⁵ Notes marginales :/Marginal notes:
Seen. A.E. R[itchie]
Noted. N.A. R[obertson] 1.8.60
Mr. R.B. Bryce to see. [N.A. Robertson]