ision and firm-It is in view of on the one side, I am constrainhe peace of the , sir, that my t, for after all, willing to admit of the way in may be most But I agree Massachusetts,

VINTHEOP,] that ter. Whatever for maintaining are agreed as to a asserting and one portion of ms before the essary with the arm—there is it to .time and effect the same and emigration adjudge and deirty years ago, trament of time, the state of tho er from a deciactually getting in their efforts ent of that matration done all inefficient, and true, that there and Americane, and people went connexion. I ey have nearly the spring of n convention at hole of Oregon? rger portion of f 1844, ratified Mr. Greenhow that so late as four hundred These, then, are hat it was to be and that they Refuse now to at a distrust of pting measures. in my opinion, but that thou-ne there will reall be continued, f the Columbia, all that she de-

o confidence in ivity," whether tupid and bunther for nations n-spring of suc-akings. According to the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr.] me that no war will possibly grow out of this question in which Great Britain will not necessarily and the result of their experiment is a glorious commentary upon the superiority of determination—of firmness, of settivity. We are told by him that they endured for ten years the hardships, and oppressions, and exactions of the mother country, before they took up arms to redress themselven; and we are admented to imitate the patient forbearance. But what did this forbearance effect for them? Inactivity but brought upon them an accumulation of wrongs, an increase of exactions, and an addition of hardships. It was activity—a firm and open avowal of their rights, and a determined effort to maintain them—that worked out a vindication of their rights, and a determined effort to maintain them—that worked out a vindication of their rights, and a redress of all their grievances. Let us imitate them in their last resolve—let us declare our and a redress of all their grievances. Let us imitate them in their last resolve—let us declare our right not merely to establish forts and post-routes, but our right to the territory, to the soil—and by the time, we shall need them, we have 50 we have and time we shall need them, we have fifty thousand people in Oregon. Instead of seven thousand men, women, and children, we shall have twice that number of fighting men-men of nerve and skill in the use of the deadly rifle-ready and on the spot to defend their homes and their firesides. But those gentlemen who promise to get for us the whole of Oregon if we will not pass the notice, tell us that their plan will not lead to war. Theirs is the p cific policy, if we would trust to their skill in prophecy. But let us analyze their plan and see how it is to work in practice. They, like us, advocate our right to the whole, and that we shall take posses-

sion of it, or encourage our people to do so.

The only difference between us is, that we propose to notify Great Britain of our intentionspropose to do the same thing without any notice. Well, how do they propose to take possession? Why, by erecting forts, by establishing post offices and post routes, and by extending our laws over our emigrants, and by encouraging them to make permanent settlements in the country, and to reduce and cultivate the earth. And all this is to be done throughout the whole extent from 49° to 54° 40'. To limit these establishments to the Columbia, or by the 49°, is at once to admit that you intend to surrender the balance of the territory. Can Great Britain fail to see in all this a determination to oust her from the country? Is she so blind that she can-not see—so deaf that she cannot hear—so dull that she cannot understand? Think you that our actions will not apeak to her louder than any words we could employ? Will not our forts, and our militia, and our farms, and our workshops, speak to her in language stronger than what we can put into any written notice we can serve upon her, and tell her

one may bring it on a little more speedily than the other, but war is as likely to follow the one as the other, and in either case Great Britain must begin it.

I am, therefore, in favor of the notice, because I helieve that there is a disposition on the part of almost every member of this House to take possesion of some portion of this territory—to encourage our citizens to emigrate there, and to make permanent and exclusive settlements, and to extend our lawe and institutions over them. This cannot be done, in my estimation, consistently with subsisting treaty stipulations, until after the notice is given and the treaty abrogated. The notice is the only way in which we can in proper faith rid ourselves of our obligations to Great Britain. And this course is as necessary for those who think our claim does not extend beyond the 49°, as for those who would be satisfied with nothing less than the whole. For the subjects of Great Britain have the rights of ingress. and egress and of trade into every portion of the territory—to the south as well as to the north of 49°, and to the south as well as to the north of the Columbia. To curtail or destroy these privileges by any measures which shall operate either directly or remotely to produce such a result, cannot justly be done without first putting an end to the treaty of 1827. And I very much doubt whether we shall be able to get the signature of the President to any laws, the immediate or remote effect of which would be to exclude Great Britain from any portion of the country, until the notice has been first given. Treaties, when once concluded, are invested by the constitution of the United States with the force and name of laws, and by that same instrument the President is bound by his oath to see that the laws are faithfully executed—faithfully is the word eccording to their direction, their spirit, their letter,

and in no other way.

Again: I am for the notice, because, if we are to written notice we can serve upon her, and tell her of our determination to appropriate the whole country? And if she is determined to retain any portion of it, will she not prepare to do it at once, at the point of the bayonet, and at the cannon's mouth? To expect anything else, is to calculate largely upon the blindness or tame submission of that haughty powers. The gautiemen appear, themselves, to have some apprehension after all that their plan may not work so peacefully and quietly; and they attempt to prepare and reconcile us to the war which their plan may bring about by telling us that it will make forcat Britain the aggressor; and they amplify most eloquently upon the manifold advantages of being in the defensive. I am willing to admit that there are great and manifest advantages in being on the defensive in any controversy, whether it be of a warlike or other character. But it would seem to

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