"tive authority of some of the subor-"dinate bodies has not been exceeded. "For the supreme sovereign authority is "always obliged to allow the authority of "its subordinates to be questioned, in "some form or other, by judicial authority, "in order to keep up a check on their "usurpation of power; though sometimes "it resorts to that highly unsatisfactory "expedient for getting out of the diffi-"culty—an *ex post facto* ratification of "acts which are admittedly illegal."

The second arises from that dangerous kind of private legislation which is exemplified in the famous Goodhue case. The opinions of the learned judges in appeal, particularly that of Draper, C. J., the head of the Court, fully illustrate the evil of intermeddling with the testamentary dispositions of persons deceased regarding their property. It was but lately that we noticed one of the sprightliest judgments ever delivered by Baron Bramwell, wherein he makes a shrewd thrust at the Court of Chancery. He observes: "Originally the common law "treated the penalty of a bond as the "debt to be recovered, construing the "document on the principle that the "obligor in all probability meant what "he said. The Court of Chancery, how-"ever, thought that it knew what he "meant much better than he himself did, "and introduced, what I cannot help "calling the unfortunate practice of re-"lieving from the penalty on payment of "the sum named in the defeasance and "costs:" *Preston* v. *Davies*, 21 W. R. 128. But in Canada, instead of the Court of Chancery, it is the High Court of Parliament that merits the stricture when it assumes to know better than the persons themselves what testators should have done with their property.

The last case is the danger arising from short patchwork Acts introduced by volunteer members on their own responsibility, designed to cure some special case of hardship that has come under their own notice. The motive is laudable, no doubt, but it may prove disastrous. It was Lord Redesdale who said: "Re-"formers are too apt to look to one "grievance, and propose a remedy which "would produce a thousand." It is all very well when we find such a judge as Wilson, J., calling attention to the state of the law of evidence as regards husband and wife in the pointed observations already cited by us—it is right, in such a case, to bring in a bill, as has been done, to amend the law of evidence in that particular. It is time to legislate for the attachment of equitable debts, as is being done this session of the Ontario House, when we find a judge so careful and conscientious as the Chancellor thus expressing himself: "It is unfortunate in "the interests of justice, that the remedy "given by the Common Law Procedure "Act in case of garnishee proceedings "should not in terms apply to an equit-"able debt. The principle upon which "the Act proceeds applies to an equitable "debt as much as to a legal debt; and I "can see no reason why the creditor "should not have a remedy in the one "case as well as the other. As the law "stands it is an anomaly—but the remedy "is with the Legislature not with the "Court:" *Blake* v. *Jarvis*, 17 Grant, p. 204. But how many of the law measures of the Session find a foundation upon judicial utterances? The stand taken by the Hon. E. B. Wood against the experimental legislation of young members of the House has been most commendable, and we trust that the experience of the older heads may secure the withdrawal of all crude attempts at an amendment of the laws.