contend that it is an unwarranted and an incorrect statement of the law. The line of decisions which begins with *Re Hogan (ubi sup.)* are certainly no authority for it.—*Law Times.*

EXTENT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN CRIMINAL CASES ON COLLATERAL MATTER.—In a criminal case a witness for the defence, on cross-examination, and without objection, testified that he had collected money in Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland, to assist in the defence; that he had raised between $800 and $900 for that purpose; that the witness had contributed about $500 to that fund. The witness was then asked by the district attorney, "Who were the parties here in Portland who contributed to that fund?" To this question an objection was made, but overruled and an exception taken. Witness answered: "Sliter." The witness then testified, under like objections and exceptions, that Sliter and McNamara contributed $100; that John Russell kept a saloon on Washington street, and contributed to the fund; that "The Mascot" also contributed; that Paul Fuhr also contributed $100, but not in Portland; that Frenchy Gratton contributed in the neighborhood of $200, and that his business was gambling. None of the parties referred to were witnesses in the case, nor were they in any manner connected with the trial any further than contributing sums of money to aid the defendant, who was on trial for the murder of Emil Weber.

As appears from the dissenting opinion of Lord, J., the record disclosed "that the gamblers of the city of Portland were divided into two factions—one headed by the defendant, Olds, the other by Emil Weber—between whom there existed a fierce feud, which finally culminated in the death of Weber at the hands of the defendant, Olds." And it further appears that the witness, a portion of whose cross-examination by the district attorney has been given, was "a gambling man," and, being witness for the defence, it is fair to presume that he belonged to the faction of gamblers headed by the defendant, Olds.

The question presented to the Supreme Court was, "whether or not the cross-examination above referred to, and to which objection had been taken, was such error as called for a reversal of the judgment of the court below, the defendant having been convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to death."

The court, in passing on this question says (*State* v. *Olds*, 22 Pac. Rep., 940): "The state had the right, on the cross-examination, to ask this witness anything that would show his interest in the result of the trial, and anything he did in aid of the defendant about the trial, for the purpose of enabling the jury to properly weigh his evidence, and to intelligently pass upon his credibility. This was done without objection. . . . Was it competent for the State to prove, as independent facts, that certain saloonkeepers and gamblers in the city of Portland contributed in making a defence in this case? This question may be answered by referring to one or two of the plainest and simplest elementary rules of the law of evidence. 'And it is an established rule, which we state as the first rule governing the production of evidence, that the evidence offered must correspond with the allegations, and be confined to the point in issue.' 1 Greenl. on Ev., Sec. 51. A few cases may be cited in which this rule has been indirectly or