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government a memorandum outlining its views as to how President Eisenhower's proposal could be most effectively implemented. While that memorandum was sponsored solely by the United States government, which arose out of those bilateral conversations, the Canadian government was consulted in advance about the terms of this memorandum.

After consideration we were able to say that we were in general agreement in these proposals to which we have been giving very careful consideration. And in that consideration we have had to face a number of difficult questions. For example: should the international agency suggested by the President hold in its own possession uranium or fissionable material to be supplied by contributing nations; if so, where? Alternatively, perhaps the agency might itself hold little or no material, and be in a position to draw upon stocks held by contributing nations up to the amounts pledged.

Another question to resolve is whether the proposed international agency should itself construct, own or operate atomic reactors, or whether it should confine its activities to arranging for the provision of the materials and technical assistance required by countries wishing to undertake this atomic development program for peaceful purposes.

A problem of importance concerns the proposed international agency itself. Should it be associated with the United Nations? In what way would it be financed? What would be the basis for determining who should be represented on it?

Hon. members will note that I have framed my remarks on these matters as questions without answers. We are seeking for these answers, in consultation with our friends. But I think in view of our experience over the years that so much in the way of international discussion of atomic energy has been bedevilled by propaganda and frustrated by political fears—in view of that experience I think it is wise in the early stages at least to have these discussions conducted privately and confidentially.

And that is what has been going on. In due course, if these bilateral discussions about which we are talking turn out to be successful, then the discussions can be broadened to include other countries importantly concerned. I think in the privacy of discussions at this stage, however, lies the best hope that the talks will be used for serious negotiation rather than for propaganda.

But the more we study this question of atomic energy and its use, without control, for destructive purposes, the more important of

course become arrangements, and the necessity for these arrangements, for collective defence, for co-operation for peace among the free world.

The basis of the security which we are seeking in this field is of course international action—international collective action on the broadest possible front. Mr. Dulles himself, the Secretary of State, made that very clear in some very impressive words which appeared in an article which came out last week in *Foreign Affairs*, under his name. He wrote:

The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defence. They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve security.

And he went on to say:

This is true of the United States. Without the co-operation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an attacking nation. That requires international facilities. Without them, our air striking power loses much of its deterrent power. With them, strategic air power becomes what Sir Winston Churchill called the "supreme deterrent". He—

That is, Sir Winston Churchill.

—credited to it the safety of Europe during recent years. But such power, while now a dominant factor, may not have the same significance forever. Furthermore, massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstances.

And he concluded this part of his article by saying:

Security for the free world depends, therefore, upon the development of collective security and community power rather than upon purely national potentials . . .

I am sure the house will agree that those are very wise words, indeed. Now the broadest base for the accumulation of this collective community power is in the United Nations itself. It is the only international organization we have which is universal in character. But now that very universality makes its deterrent value not as great as it should be, and makes it not very effective as an instrument for collective community power at the present time.

It can be effective, and it has been shown to be effective in Korea; and it could be more effective if we implement the "uniting for peace resolution" of the UN general assembly. But the fact is that, as the United Nations is now constituted, reflecting the cold war which is still raging, it cannot be a satisfactory and effective agent for universal collective security—not effective enough to remove our fears.