that by accident and rather bad planning they bunched up at the border and some of them had to go across it because there was a jam at the railhead. It was that event, prominently, amongst other things, which induced the Kaiser to move fast.

In other words, I think that the massive organizations of alliance structures—and the technological changes involved today do not necessarily change the inner psychology of the alliance system—are themselves propellents towards war and accident.

Mr. Gillespie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Professor McNaught, in yesterday's newspaper I believe there was a story to the effect that the Russian government was in favour of Canada withdrawing from NATO. Most of Canada's traditional friends are in NATO. If Canada were to withdraw from NATO, how, in your view, could it do so without causing concern and anguish to its friends, and without giving aid and comfort to the Russian government? One of the arguments used in favour of our continuing in NATO is that, if we were to withdraw, it would give aid and comfort to the Russian government and distress our friends.

Professor McNaught: You may think I have skated on thin ice already; this is going to be really thin, but I believe the case I am going to put. What distresses me about the way in which you have put the question is the assumption that we have friends and we have enemies.

The Chairman: I avoided using the term "enemies".

• 1335

Professor McNaught: However, the counterpart of friend is enemy and while it is true that some of our traditional friends are in NATO, so are some of our traditional enemies. An enemy today is not necessarily an enemy tomorrow and *vice versa*. One of the real problems we face, a problem which all of us who have lived through the cold war should recognize, is that the existence of an alliance system itself tends toward that very cast of mind of dividing the world into friends and enemies, and thus of reducing the flexibility of responses to individuals inside the other camp. This is precisely one of the areas in which Canada has been most restricted by her military alliance membership.

I am obviously not going to take the step to say we should regard Russia as a friend, but I think we should certainly not take the step and automatically say that Russia is an enemy.

The Chairman: If Canada were to consider entering a state of neutrality, do you think there is any possibility at all that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. would recognize Canadian neutrality? In your view do you think there is any possibility that Russia and the United States would recognize Canada as being in a state of neutrality in view of its geographical position?

Professor McNaught: The recognition of neutrality, of course, is a complicated problem in international law. I have not proposed that we should try and get for ourselves a scrap of paper such as the Belgians have relied on since the 1830s with an international guarantee of neutrality, but rather that we should not align ourselves positively and militarily which, as I say, creates the division of the world psychologically, politically and the rest of it. My answer is that probably they would both recognize that neutrality if we wanted them to, although I would not advocate it.

The Chairman: Why would you not advocate it?

Professor McNaught: I cannot see any particular end to be served by advocating it. To advocate a formal neutrality of the Belgian, Swiss or Swedish type, it seems to me. while it would not be a serious restriction on your flexibility of foreign policy, it would be an unnecessary restriction on it. Everybody knows that the Swedes and the Swiss do, in fact, have restrictions on their foreign policy which flow directly from their formal neutrality.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor McNaught. Are there any other questions?

On your behalf, I would like to thank Professor McNaught for being with us this morning. I know we found it very interesting and I hope you found it interesting as well, Professor McNaught.

Professor McNaught: I have indeed. Thank you, very much.

1016