To a large extent, the future relevance of NATO will depend on the degree to which it adopts, reflects and strives for a broader definition of security. Security must become cooperative rather than competitive. The time for the zero-sum game is over. Even more than in the past, NATO must embrace security through arms control with as much vigour as it has pursued security through armament.

NATO must review urgently and comprehensively all aspects of its nuclear and conventional strategy. It makes little sense to retain nuclear weapons whose only target can be our new friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It makes little sense to retain a military strategy which is based on a scenario of a surprise attack across a front which no longer exists and where surprise is no longer possible. And it makes little sense to continue to retain in Europe the largest peace-time deployment of military force in the history of the world.

This is not to deny the continuing requirement for prudence and military stability at this time of historic change. Twelve months do not invalidate the lessons of history. The possibility of instability is there and Soviet military capabilities remain substantial. Therefore, a strong military mandate for NATO continues to be valid and the North American commitment to Europe represented by the presence of Canadian and American troops there is crucial as we strive for strategic stability at significantly lower levels of military force.

But NATO cannot be seen as a barrier to the peace it has preserved so well for over 40 years. If NATO does not lead, it will lose the critical legitimacy it has enjoyed in Europe. NATO will be seen not as part of the solution, but as part of the problem.

It is important that NATO become even more actively engaged in the dynamic security dialogue now emerging between East and West. Those security questions involve NATO's members and NATO's interests; the Alliance should turn outwards to embrace its old adversaries and new friends.

To this end, early consideration might be given to the Soviet Foreign Minister meeting on a regular basis with NATO Foreign Ministers. Similarly, a direct and regular dialogue between the leaders of the Western Alliance and the USSR might be worthy of pursuit.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, NATO should develop an enhanced capacity and role in confidence-building and verification activities. Dedicated, multinational forces on the ground might be deployed for this purpose. NATO should also look to the establishment of a Verification Centre to co-ordinate these activities.