There is the danger, therefore, that the Soviet handling of the U-2 incident and the aftermath of the summit meeting in Paris could, if the West allowed emotion to triumph over reason, lead to a renewal of serious tension. How can the Western nations help to keep the temperature down?

West Must be Temperate.

First, whatever propaganda excesses may be indulged in by the Soviet leaders, let us in the West not reach in our turn for the lexicon of abuse.

In my reading of the press, I am disturbed from time to time that there are those in positions of military responsibility who indulge themselves in the dangerous course of vocal rocket-rattling. I can think of no more sterile or irresponsible use of the responsibilities of office than a tendency to brandish the symbols of military power.

Secondly, President Eisenhower has made clear his determination that, while Western vigilance must in no circumstances be relaxed, contacts with the Soviet Union must be maintained and relations conducted in a business-like manner. The Canadian Government supports the President's position. We consider that it offers the only reasonable avenue for the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. The inability of East and West to begin summit discussions in Paris does not deny the importance of establishing processes of negotiation. It is essential for the West to pursue whatever fields of contact exist with the Soviet Union, notably, at the present time, on nuclear weapons tests and disarmament. Nothing could damage the Western interest more than to refuse to treat these negotiations seriously.

Latest Soviet Arms Proposal.

A few days ago Mr. Khrushchov produced another version of his earlier disarmament plan. It is an elaborate document and demands, and will receive, careful study in the Committee of Ten Nations which resumes its negotiations in Geneva on Tuesday, June 7. Much will depend, in estimating the significance of the new plan, on its provisions for inspection and control, for no disarmament plan can be motivated by serious intent unless it contains practical verification procedures.

It is obvious from the fanfare with which Mr. Khrushchov paraded his new plan that the propaganda effect was to the forefront, but the important thing for the West is to determine whether in a package wrapped to appeal to world opinion there may be some item of genuine value. However unacceptable the contents may appear on first inspection, I hope that the West will never allow itself to be accused of dismissing any proposal without careful scrutiny.