both these negative results by rejecting both these extreme positions. I believe we should take this middle position not in the interest of any one state and certainly not to reward or approve any action taken by any state which we have already condemned, but I suggest we should follow this course in the interest of peace and security.

Certainly Israel has no right to attach her conditions to withdrawal of her forces, but as delegations to the United Nations Assembly we have, I think, the right and indeed perhaps even the duty to relate these two positions in a way which will make impossible in the future the kind of situation which we have been facing in the last two or three months. I believe as delegations we have, at least my delegation thinks it has, the right to feel that our attitude towards the one problem must be influenced by the attitude of the Assembly towards the other Failure to agree on a middle course of this type would mean perhaps, indeed probably, failure to agree on any course. That would mean deadlock and the return not only to the unhappy conditions but to conditions that might be even worse and even more dangerous to international peace and security. It would have also consequences for this organization which might be far I know that you will agree that it is our responsibility to avoid this disastrous result, which surely no one wants.

The Secretary-General's report which we have before us, and which we have been considering, shows the way out of this deadlock. He has given his views, sane and reasonable, I think, on the steps which should be taken after withdrawal but which perhaps we can approve now. These steps must be taken within the limits fixed by previous resolutions and decisions of the United Nations which until we alter them remain in effect. His report emphasizes, rightly I think, that action through the recommendations of this Assembly should be contrasted with decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter; Assembly recommendations require for their implementation the consent of the parties concerned.

The main argument of the Secretary-General's report is that we must return to useful implementation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, but that this should be joined with United Nations action to secure and supervise such implementation, something which has been absent in recent years. This requires that we take action for ensuring implementation. The mere injunction on the parties concerned to observe the Armistice Agreement in its entirety may not prove to be very effective. The Secretary-General said on page 5 of his report:

"...There is universal recognition that the condition of affairs, of which this deterioration formed part, should not be permitted to return. Renewed full implementation of the clauses of the Armistice Agreement obviously presumes such an attitude on the part of the governments concerned, and such supporting measures as