

Eden, the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, to the effect that we should be very careful on the question of appeasement and hasty recognition. I venture to read into the record again one paragraph of the statement by Mr. Eden quoted by the leader of the opposition, as it appears at page 465 of Hansard:

As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. It is a real misfortune that in this, as in other Far Eastern matters, we should be acting piecemeal. . .

That was the quotation given by the leader of the opposition the other evening. The copy of Mr. Eden's statement on that occasion which I have seen, and which I would like to put on record, adds a few words to that quotation; and I now quote from the text of Mr. Eden's statement:

As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. The decision to recognize is no doubt eventually inescapable. . .

Those are the additional words in my text.

The third condition laid down by the leader of the opposition---though I do not know whether you could call it a condition---was that we should agree on help to the peoples of Asia; and I am sure there will be no difference of opinion on that.

The fourth suggestion he made was in his reference to a Pacific pact, and on that very important question he quoted me as follows---I refer to his words as reported at page 464 of Hansard:

The proposal has been put forward in this house on different occasions by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green), that a Pacific pact to complement the Atlantic pact should be brought into being. Today the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that that could not be done because if the nations of the Pacific were to be invited to consider a Pacific pact it would be necessary to invite Russia and China.

That is not exactly what I said. I said that would be one consideration, whether it would be possible to invite Russia and China to a conference which would be discussing a regional pact in the Pacific. Of course I am not quite so naive as to suggest that if an invitation of that kind were sent, and if it had the conditions which normally attach to such invitations, the Russians would accept it. I am not even sure whether it would be of any use to send them such an invitation. My argument against a Pacific pact at this time, which is not mentioned in this statement, was that in my opinion it would be futile and unwise to proceed with a conference to negotiate a Pacific security and mutual guarantee pact at a time when the United States, the United Kingdom and India have indicated that they would not be able to participate in any such conference. Surely that serious argument is enough to explain why we have not accepted certain advice which has been given us in this house to push ahead with a Pacific pact at this time.

I thought I had made my position perfectly clear on this matter both on Friday and on previous occasions, and that in doing so I had not lapsed into the diplomatic language of mumbo-jumbo. If, however, the situation in the Pacific should change and should become analogous to the situation that obtained in the Atlantic when we proceeded to work out the North Atlantic Pact, then certainly we would have to reconsider our attitude toward this matter.