

8. The expert review teams contemplated in Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol review information submitted under Article 7, by each Party included in Annex I. In this regard:

(a) Should we integrate the requirements of Article 8.3 and 8.5 with the procedures that may be developed to implement Articles 18, 16, and 19? If so, how?

(b) Although the expert review teams may provide information relevant to whether an Annex I Party is at risk of non-compliance or may not be in compliance, do the teams have authority to make any determination (initial, provisional, or otherwise) that such Party is in non-compliance?

(c) If the report of the review team (issued after the end of a commitment period of an Annex I Party) does not indicate non-compliance by the Annex I Party with its emissions limitation and reduction commitment under Article 3 of the Protocol, does that preclude any Party from being able to raise an issue of non-compliance?

(d) Should a review team possess authority to initiate, by its own determination, a procedure adopted pursuant to Article 18 that could result in binding consequences to a Party?

(e) Should a review team possess authority to initiate, by its own determination, a procedure that may be developed to implement Article 16?

#### Institutional issues

9. Who should be able to initiate a procedure for determining and addressing non-compliance with the Protocol?

10. From what sources may such an institutional arrangement seek, receive or consider information?

11. Should such an institutional arrangements be ad hoc or standing in nature?

12. If it is a standing body, how frequently should it be convened?

13. What should be the size and composition of such an institutional arrangement?

14. What expertise should be required of its members and in what capacity should they serve?

15. What rules of procedure should govern its operations? How could these best ensure due process, and the transparency of its operation?