

a crisis by breaking weapons out of storage. This option likewise has the disadvantage of relying upon third-party monitoring and "good faith".

A third, more ambitious option, would be to attempt to broker a Tlatelcolo-type regional **non-nuclearization/denuclearization agreement**. If this could be achieved, it might entirely resolve the problem of regional nuclearization. However, as previously mentioned, the presence of an intractable third-party actor would likely kill any such initiative at birth since India is unlikely to agree to divest itself of its nuclear capability, while China is viewed as an expansionist, hostile and nuclear-armed opponent.

One of the more successful arms control agreements of the 1980s was the 1986 Intermediate Nuclear Forces, or INF Treaty. This agreement achieved the **regional elimination of a highly destabilizing class of weapons**, including all ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometres and a payload of 600 kilograms. A similar treaty might be negotiated on the Sub-continent (this in fact was proposed by Bailey and Morimoto in a 1998 article in *Comparative Strategy*), aimed at eliminating the most destabilizing class of weapons: tactical, theatre and medium-range ballistic missiles, offering short flight times and low trajectories. The elimination of these weapons would leave both India and Pakistan capable of using aircraft delivery for their strategic weapons, increasing decision making time in a crisis, and augmenting regional nuclear stability. The disadvantage of this option, of course, is that Islamabad and New Delhi are less than an hour apart by combat aircraft, so the gain in stability will not be great; and, to further complicate the problem, India considers the development of an indigenous space programme a hallmark of a First World state, and thus would be loathe to divest itself of its hard-won long-range ballistic missile capability.

Other arms-control options might include encouraging India and Pakistan to **ratify the CTBT**, and the brokering of a comprehensive and verifiable **Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)**. In this context, it is worth noting that, for example, pushing both states to ratify the CTBT will take some doing; Musharraf's foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, recently announced that even if Pakistan ratifies the CTBT, it would not forego its right to conduct reciprocal nuclear tests *vis-à-vis* India.¹⁹ Both states could, and should, also be encouraged to **observe the NPT in principle** as "compliant non-signatories." This would serve to bolster their reputations, and convince the world that although they intend to remain nuclear weapons states, they will at least be responsible ones. They could do so by following its provisions voluntarily, particularly with regard to not sharing nuclear technology with other states. While far from a panacea, this would be an effective good-faith gesture by both countries.

¹⁹ Both India and Pakistan are discovering that it is one thing to possess nuclear weapons, but quite another to devise the robust, reliable and responsive command and controls structures, without which nuclear weapons are so much sophisticated junk metal. For the Pakistani perspective, see Umar Farooq, "Pakistan tests new missile and revises command structure", *Jane's Defence Weekly* (16 February 2000), p. 3.