most exploitable resource. Given its geopolitical situation, Iraq has legitimate security concerns vis-à-vis its neighbours. The most direct threat is posed by Iran with which Iraq fought a protracted war. North Korea, by contrast, is bordered by China and the Russian Federation, both of which have been considered since World War II as supporting states. Though projecting the Republic of Korea and the presence of United Nations (United States) forces in its southern border as potential aggressors, this assessment is clearly based on political expediency rather than any legitimate security concern.

REGIONAL/GLOBAL INTERFACE

Although the conventional threat of two heavily armed states, Iraq and North Korea, is the basis of immediate concern for neighbouring states, the international dimension includes both regional and global considerations. In that sense while each regional threat can be and is seen as unique, the global aspect of both focusses on the same issue which is the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. From that perspective, the United Nations actions through the IAEA and UNSCOM in developing an on-going monitoring and verification regime in Iraq, have direct and immediate relevancy to a final and peaceful solution to the North Korean dilemma. The problem is that a proven on-going monitoring and verification regime is unlikely to be in place and operating until 1996 at the earliest. The North Korean issue requires initial steps now.

VERIFICATION OF FUTURE COMPLIANCE

Though the nature, shape and number of agreements relating to North Korean compliance with future obligations are unknown, it is likely to pose a complicated framework for on-going monitoring and verification. Such a framework will include both a multilateral and a bilateral dimension. The multilateral dimension will benefit from the experience already gathered and will include a significant interplay with the United Nations. Bilaterally, the focus will be on South Korea/North Korea interface. Some sort of third party involvement might be seen as a useful means of facilitating the bilateral process. Even though the agreements are not arrived at, it is possible, even at this stage, to identify precautionary steps which might be taken for preparatory purposes.

MULTILATERAL VERIFICATION

To enhance on-going monitoring and verification in the aftermath of the Iraq experience, the IAEA has already taken some important steps in a generic problem-solving sense. First, the agency is attempting to establish an "early warning" capability through wider access of information from states. The aim is to enhance the agency's capacity to cross-check and confirm reports on international transfers, detect undeclared nuclear material and installations, and more quickly sound the alarm when needed. Second, the agency is considering expanding its powers to the