

Example 12

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Probability of Survival} &= (1-\text{TKP})(1-\text{TKP}) \\ &= (1-0.78)(1-0.78) \\ &= (0.22)(0.22) \\ &= 0.05 \\ &= 5\% \end{aligned}$$

At this point it must be accepted that, with a capability to destroy all but 5% of the Soviet ICBM force, an American planner would also target, in a simultaneous strike, all Soviet aircraft and strategic submarines. If the purpose were a disarming, first-strike counter-force attack, it is evident that this additional targeting would take place. Since aircraft and submarine bases cannot in their nature be hardened other than in certain limited ways, this additional targeting, both for the Soviets and the Americans, could be easily accomplished using a small fraction of their remaining forces, including those significantly less accurate than the forces cited in the calculations above.

However, calculations of damage to strategic aircraft and submarines are so problematic that they cannot easily be merged with the relatively accurate (or at least methodologically consistent) analyses of counter-force targeting on silos.

The explanation for this is basically two-fold. First, it is difficult to obtain information about the range of factors involved in targeting submarine pens and airfields. These include such diverse considerations as the serviceability of aircraft, dispersal plans, including arming and fuelling, the percentage of aircraft on quick reaction alert, the percentage of submarines at sea, the vulnerability of submarines and pens to overpressure, and so on. In these circumstances, the assumptions made about hardness and operational readiness need to be detailed and explicit. Second, counter-force attacks on aircraft and submarines are entirely 'scenario dependent'. In other words, the assumptions made about the