

Norman during those troubled days when he did talk a lot about his fears. Moreover, Norman had been told that Pearson was solidly behind him, and that there was no move in Ottawa towards an inquiry.

US Ambassador Hare was close to both Norman and Doss, and could have been the unwitting source for the part of the CIA message that was true and lent it credibility. In his own report, however, he wrote nothing remotely like the lines insinuating that Norman had cause to dread the revelations that a new inquiry would yield. Well publicised in subsequent months, the lines were taken by many as confirmation that Norman had in fact committed treason. Both Barros (206) and Rusher (225-6) suggest that President Eisenhower was one of the first recipients of the message, and it was because of it that he had issued such an insultingly bland statement that ignored Norman's death, and attributed the uproar in Canada to a "misunderstanding" between friends that he hoped would soon blow over.

Barros bridled when he read that Norman had complained that he might be the victim of a frameup. The whole idea was "preposterous." (176) He had been similarly outraged when Norman reportedly complained that an FBI agent had been impolite in Boston in 1942. (35) The combined actions of the Senate subcommittee, and the CIA in Cairo, may not have constituted a "frameup" in a strict sense, but they came very close. They certainly practised forgery in order to exploit the suicide to shift the heat away from the subcommittee by seemingly confirming the worst suspicions of the just deceased Ambassador. I can think of no nastier episode in Canada-US relations.

Was there a coverup?

Yes, but not enough. Canada's policy, and that of other countries, is to treat individual security cases confidentially. This denies the enemy the advantage of knowing what we know, and it protects sources, domestic and foreign. Moreover, much of the material in the security files is necessarily gossip that could be hurtful to living persons. It frequently needs correction as better information turns up. If one starts to open up a file, it becomes difficult to draw and hold a satisfactory line. The media, Parliament and the public, with whetted appetite, demand more and more. Suspicion is likely to be greater than when lips were sealed, and confidence in government less. Barros cites the handling of the Mussinger and Spencer spy cases, but these hardly make the case for openness. Rather they suggest how unproductive and ugly it is to force security cases into the political arena.