



Stockholm Document's provisions than their compliance with the more minimal and permissive provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

In whatever we in the West do, it will be important to remind ourselves continually that the essential value of the Stockholm Document lies in its collective political commitment to achieve a high degree of confidence and trust in our collective interrelationships and that it is not in any real sense a new means of information gathering.

In this connection, on-site inspection as a means of verification is of course a special case. It would be a gross mistake for any party to abuse the as yet frail and nascent inspection regime by asking for an exorbitant number of inspections or in any other way placing excessive demands on this new system. Verification activities must be reliable, accurate and credible, but they must also be realistic in their defining of objectives.

It will also be necessary to be mindful of the interests of many of the members of the Neutral and Non-Aligned group, who, like the members of the two military alliances, have essential security interests at stake in the way in which the results of the Stockholm Conference are implemented.

From a Western point of view, and indeed more specifically from a Canadian point of view, the positive outcome of the Stockholm negotiation was in very large part attributable to the effective coordination of effort between and among the NATO allies — not at the expense of others but in consultation with them, and in measured, unpolemical negotiation. This lesson should stand us in good stead for the challenges of the future.

Because Stockholm was only a beginning.

The Military Implications of the Stockholm Document and its Application to the Canadian Armed Forces

The following article was written by Colonel C.A. Namiesniowski of the Department of National Defence. Colonel Namiesniowski was Military Advisor to the Canadian delegation at the Stockholm Conference.

It is difficult to draw a clear line in arms control negotiations between political and military issues. The recently completed Stockholm Conference is no exception. Stockholm dealt with military issues which have the potential to attenuate the degree of mistrust which exists in Europe and pave the way for a future political and strategic order in Europe. While this may well be a logical extrapolation of the Stockholm success, realists seek a more practical result in hoping for full compliance with the newly agreed Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) by all participating states which by establishing normal patterns of military activities would exert pressure for stability in Europe. The latter perception is defensible on the basis of "balance and reciprocity"¹ and would not place at risk the security of any state.

Stockholm produced five militarily significant CSBMs, all of which are obligatory. They include measures of notification, observation, an annual calendar, constraining provisions and compliance and verification. These CSBMs are politically binding, apply to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals as well as the adjoining sea area and air space, and involve 35 participating states — Canada, the USA and all the states of Europe except Albania. The measures are designed to clarify intentions and improve transparency of military activities. The agreement comes into effect on January 1, 1987.

The detailed features of the individual measures are as follows:

Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities

The threshold for the notification of certain military activities is 13 000 troops or 300 battle tanks (having armament of 90 mm or more). Notification will be given in writing, in an agreed format, to all other participating states at least 42 days in advance of any of the following military activities when the threshold is met or exceeded:

1. Land forces engaged in the same exercise activity under a single operational command, independently or in combination with any possible air or naval component;
2. Information on participation of air forces in the land activity will be included if it is visualized that 200 or more air sorties will be flown by fixed-wing aircraft in support of the land force activity;
3. Amphibious landings or parachute drops if they involve 3 000 or more troops will be notified separately;
4. Transfers of troops at notifiable thresholds from outside the zone into the zone or within the zone will be notified if they engage in one of the military activities described above. Concentrations of transferred troops to participate in a notifiable activity or to be concentrated at agreed thresholds or above will also be notified.
5. Alert activities, while an exception to prior notification, will nevertheless be notified at the time the troops involved commence such activities above the agreed thresholds.

Observation of Certain Military Activities

An improved and mandatory observation regime for all notifiable military activities has been agreed at a separate threshold of 17 000 troops. There is also a separate, lower, observation threshold of 5 000 for amphibious landing or parachute assault.

¹ Madrid Mandate, September 6, 1983.