

Serbian officials implicated but presented no legal proof. Instead, after almost a month's delay, on July 23rd, Austria presented an ultimatum to Serbia, with 48 hours given for an answer.

This note demanded from the Serbian government an apology and a number of specific requirements. Some of the demands were very drastic, and number five in particular might be thought inconsistent with independence, in the opinion of so good a judge as Sir Edward Grey.

To this note, of a character "sudden, brusque, and peremptory" (to quote the language of Sir Edward Grey), Serbia made a conciliatory reply, which anyone not an Austrian would have regarded as offering reasonable compliance with the demands. But Austria-Hungary would have none of it, and drew up a series of pettifogging objections which, in view of the issues involved, seem little short of criminal. No wonder the British ambassador at Vienna expressed the opinion that the attitude of Austria made war inevitable.

On July 25th Austria withdrew her Minister from Belgrade, on July 26th began to mobilise the army, and on July 28th declared war on Serbia.

Russia took the reasonable position that the Austrian note was harsh that Austria ought to publish the proofs, that the time limit was too short, that Serbia's appeal to arbitration should be granted and that she was willing to accept Germany, France, and Italy as arbitrators. She made it plain that she must mobilise if Austria attacked Serbia. She confided to England the conviction that Austria must feel that Germany was at her back, and that Germany was the real obstacle to a peaceful settlement.

GERMANY FOR WAR.

And in fact Germany's position throughout the negotiations cannot be regarded as consistent with peaceful intentions. If Germany was heartily for peace, why did she warn the powers that Austria must be let alone to fight out her quarrel with little Serbia, when she must have known that Russia would not be content to stand by and see the bullying done? If Germany was heartily for peace, why did she quibble against the proposals of Britain for a conference to ensure the peace of Europe? If Germany was heartily for peace, why did she not, when besought by Britain and other powers, call off her satellite, Austria, in order to give time for some solution of the difficulties? There is no evidence of her using any such persuasion. If Germany was heartily for peace, why on July 31st did she issue an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that the latter should demobilise, when at that very moment Austria, apparently weakening, was engaged in conversations with Russia looking toward peace?