

The Minister's statement of July 21, also made in the House of Commons, was even more explicit:

We are not promoting either a two-China policy or a one-China one-Taiwan policy. Our policy is to recognize one government of China. We have not asked and do not ask the Government of the People's Republic of China to endorse the position of the Government of Canada on our territorial limits as a condition to agreement to establish diplomatic relations. To do so might cast doubts on the extent of our sovereignty. We do not think it would be appropriate, nor would it be in accordance with international usage, that Canada should be asked to endorse the position of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the extent of its territorial sovereignty. To challenge that position would, of course, also be inappropriate.

Other Assurances Sought by Peking

Taiwan, obviously, was not the only question discussed by the negotiators in Stockholm. The Chinese side, for example, also wanted to be assured that Canada's attitude in the United Nations would be consistent with the views expressed by the Canadian representative to the effect that it would recognize only one Chinese government; specifically, they wanted assurance that Canada would support membership for the Peking government and withdraw support from the present occupant of the China seat. The assurance was given that Canada's voting in New York would be consistent with its recognition of a new government of one China.

The Chinese also wished to have specific assurances that official relations with Taiwan would be severed when relations with Peking were established. As this had been made explicit in the Government's statements quoted above, the Canadian negotiators had no difficulty in meeting this request.

On the Canadian side, assurances were sought that the establishment of relations would be accompanied by improved contacts and that bilateral problems that had accumulated over the years would be dealt with. This would mean that Canadian claims for compensation in matters such as the nationalization of the Ming Sung ships could be discussed. Satisfactory assurances were given, as were assurances that consular arrangements should also be subject to negotiation. It was also agreed, in the words of the communiqué, that Canadian representatives in China (and Chinese representatives in Canada) would be accorded treatment "in accordance with international practice".

The drafting of a communiqué in which the agreement to recognize and exchange embassies would be recorded began in October 1969, when the Chinese side submitted a draft which would have met all their requirements. Canadian counter-drafts were proposed and Chinese amendments with Canadian counter-amendments began to be exchanged. In this process, it soon became clear that the one essential ingredient in any communiqué the Chinese would be likely to accept was a statement of their position with respect to Taiwan. Although, in the Canadian view, this was not an appropriate matter for insertion in a communiqué dealing with recognition and exchange of embassies, nevertheless efforts were made by the Canadian side to meet the situation. The pro-