

ask, where there is a fundamental deficiency, in the absolute absence of all ambiguity, why call for complications?

It has been before observed that the subject was one demanding the foresight and forethought of statesmen. Now what did the statesmen do? Acting under instructions from his Government, we find that, in 1848, the British Minister at Washington blandly suggested to the American Government, in the most honied accents of diplomacy, that, as the Rozario Channel was, beyond a doubt, the right channel, the sooner it was declared so, the more gratifying it would be, and so on, with the usual reciprocations. The Americans, not to be outdone in "bunkum," replied handsomely, and rejoined, "Haro." Here was the first official false step. This first startling impress on the sand became thenceforth hard and ineffaceable as granite.

The discussion was thenceforth nursed assiduously, and kept warm carefully, up to the year 1856, when a joint commission was appointed to settle the water boundary. The American Commissioner was Alexander Campbell, the British, Captain Prevost, R.N. The Commissioners met, reciprocated, and altercated. Prevost moored, fore and aft, in the Rozario Channel, prepared for action. Campbell was equal to any emergency in the Haro Channel. At this safe distance, they exchanged broadsides of minutes and memoranda. At length Prevost, weary of feints and dodges, broke ground, and put in a suggestion of compromise. He proposed the "Douglas" Channel, and advised his opponent to accept it at once, as he would never have another chance. Campbell answered, that he did not want another chance, and would never accept it, if he had.

Nothing of course remained to be done, but to return home and report progress. Acting on the diplomatic maxim