

a complete vindication of my opposition to it at the present. If it should be permitted to remain in force in the form that I was required to vote upon it, then time will soon determine whether my opinion of it was right or wrong. I aside the result without fear; yet, if I know myself, without a wish to see evil come of it, merely for the sake of claiming hereafter, on my part, the merit of political sagacity for my resistance to it.

These, then, were my opinions, as they are now:

First. Our country is involved in an expensive war, and the wisest among you cannot foresee its close. We have a large army invading Mexico, and a large navy off her coasts, along the Pacific Ocean and in the Gulf of Mexico. The sum already appropriated by Congress for the Government expenditures of the fiscal year, exceeds fifty millions of dollars. Will the Experimental Tariff raise revenue sufficient to "pay as we go?" Certainly not. Congress knew that, and, therefore, authorized a loan of ten millions, at the very time we were passing this tariff; and the first act of the next session will probably be one for ten millions more! Will it produce revenue enough to pay one-half of the appropriations? I am quite sure it will not. Its advocates did not assert that it will do much more. Wherefore, if this experiment works as well as its warmest friends have predicted, the Government will fall in debt twenty-five millions this (fiscal) year. So long as the war lasts, and for such a period of time after it as the war expenses continue, it will be the same thing. But if the experiment works as well as its more violent opponents have said of it, why then it will hardly go at all. I think the truth lies between them. It will work, but it will work badly, and work you deeply in debt; and if it should be adhered to, "without alteration," the public debt will be increased not much short of thirty millions the first year, and I can see no honest way to prevent its yearly increase, except by a resort to direct taxes.

Direct taxes ought to be our very last resort—public debt is an evil that I abhor, more than ever, since I was a member of Congress; and therefore it was the conclusion of my mind, that this "Experimental Tariff" ought not to be tried, and certainly not at this particular time. The acts of Congress which went to diminish the revenue, but to increase the expenditures, did not seem to me to be consistent with prudence in any Government, more especially in a time of war. The tariff system, according to my judgment, was a most unfit subject for party experiments; and, at the time of a yearly expenditure of fifty millions of dollars, and of a foreign war, such experiments amounted to party rashness. If the war should end soon, still the Government here, we knew, expected to terminate it by a treaty for peace and a new territory, viz: California. No honest country would take the territory without paying the owner for it, and if we would, Mexico cannot yield it upon any other terms. Hence it was that whether we were to have peace or war with Mexico, we needed much more money to carry on the Government. When the plainest rules of arithmetic and common sense thus compelled me to withhold my support from a tariff experiment, to be made now, at the expense of the nation's credit, how could I hesitate?

Second. The tariff of 1842 ought to have been modified, but not by an act, which reduced the duties as early as the last December.

In all great alterations of the tariff diminishing duties, the reductions ought to be made upon reasonable notice to the people, whose property and business will be affected by them. In that case, there may be inconvenience to some, but it does not bring ruin down upon so many innocent people. Not giving time, infant factories are destroyed by the hand of legislation, and the older and more mature establishments, are compelled to diminish their operations forthwith, and consequently to discharge a number of their laborers, and reduce the wages of all. The laborers suffer more than the owners, because they are less able to bear it. The sudden loss of work will be to many of them and their families a loss of food and raiment; and that which the law-maker is commended to pray for—his "dearly bread"—he would be thus rudely taking by law from the workmen of his country. And the experimental tariff act was the more objectionable, inasmuch as many of our country-

men—the northern laborers, who are to suffer under it—will be put out of employment in the beginning of winter, when other employments will be obtained with greater difficulty; and at the North, the poor, when without labor and wages, encounter a degree of suffering, in that inclement season, which we have no just conception of at the South. You must see it, before you can fully appreciate it. Also, a sudden alteration of the tariff must, of necessity, disturb the home market of our manufacturers, coal-diggers, and mechanics, and involve hundreds and thousands—in losses to some, ruin to others, and suffering to many.

Even a bad tariff law, then, should not be repealed so as to fall down too hastily, when its gradual abrogation would create less inconvenience to the Government, and its sudden change may oppress the poor, or do injustice to any section. The Government ought to have compassion on all the people, and particularly upon the laboring classes. The manufacturers at the North are not all "Abbot Lawrences," whose fortune has been the theme of so many tariff speeches. The compromise tariff act, under General Jackson, in 1833, reduced the duties gradually and periodically for nine years. It gave nine years' notice. This Experimental Tariff will reduce all the duties upon only four months' notice! The letter was harsh, cruel, unjust legislation—harsh to the wealthy, cruel to the laborer, and unjust to both; and the general welfare did not require it.

Third. The tariff system, of itself a great change; the Warehousing act, another; and the Experimental Tariff, the greatest of them all—will, when taken together, work an entire revolution of our financial system. One at a time they might have been introduced more safely, some of them wisely. But by being so nearly united, as they will be, in the time of their commencement, it was calculated to excite apprehension and alarm. To put them into simultaneous operation, was, indeed, a political movement of party, too violent and too potent for good. It will affect all the business of the people most injuriously; and, with a Government expenditure of fifty millions, and a revenue under twenty millions, the Government itself may be crushed under their combined operation. To attempt it when the nation was at war abroad, and the Government was in the money-market, or soon expected there, as a borrower at home, clearly appeared to my mind to be unwisely jeopardizing public credit and private confidence. Revolutions are seldom reforms, and certainly reforms need not always be revolutions. One must reasonably fear, that, without a miracle, such strong measures, acting with their combined power against the existing order of things in the country, may create a revolution in trade, pecuniary distress, hard times, popular excitement, and sectional agitation, prevailing another contest for the Presidency, and do nobody any good, but a few political agitators and rich speculators. I thought they would go very far towards producing an overthrow of the Democratic party, if they did not entirely accomplish it. These consequences were too natural not to be apprehended; and the last-mentioned result was openly predicted by some, and probably anticipated by others, of my own political friends, who yet voted for the experimental tariff bill, without approving of it. Unless it should be repealed or materially modified, its consequences now, belong to the developments of the future; so I need not illustrate the grounds of my conviction by minute statements. Let time test its correctness.

Fourth. In none of the tariff acts of the United States in former years was the industry of our own country burdened by discriminations made against home manufactures. Their policy was to build up, and not to destroy—to protect, and not to oppress. Not so the Experimental Tariff. And is it not a mistake to suppose that the republican people of North Carolina were at any time hostile to those acts merely because they were "protective"? Our hostility was aimed at the extent of the thing, not the thing itself—at extreme protection, not protection *per se*. With here and there an individual exception, (for Republicans in those days were allowed to differ,) I boldly affirm that this was the Republican doctrine of our State; and the people will know it to be true, when I remind them that it was precisely the point of our dispute with

the Nullifiers. They were against protection out and out. We, the (Jackson) Republican party of North Carolina, in particular, went for incidental protection—moderate protection, by a "judicious tariff." They were for declaring the tariff of 1833 and 1839 unconstitutional, and nullifying it, because it protected manufactures. We thought it was unjust, because the protection was extreme, but not unconstitutional, and that the "Union must be preserved." What the Republican party of North Carolina thought then, I thought, and spoke, and wrote.

And coming down to more recent events, let me say, that McKay's Bill of 1844 was a tariff of incidental protection, which you and I, and all the Democrats in Congress from North Carolina, approved and sustained, and the people of our party, in North Carolina, nowhere opposed last year, and the press of the party defended up to the inauguration and afterwards, and even down to the day of the report from the present Secretary of the Treasury. Careful study, longer experience, and closer examination, have confirmed me in the faith of those times, sanctioned, as it was, by the authority of the administrations of Washington, and Jefferson, and Madison, and Monroe, and Jackson, all southern Republicans and southern Presidents. Is consistency treason? It may be a misfortune to me that I was unable to change with the times, but it would be a crime to deny my faith. To avoid misrepresentation, I give you the words of those wise and eminent and patriotic men. Hear Washington!

Extract of a speech of George Washington, President of the United States, to Congress, Jan. 8, 1790.

"A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-disciplined militia is requisite; and their safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military, supplies."

"The advancement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, by all proper means, will not, I trust, need recommendation."

In accordance with this general recommendation, the House of Representatives passed a resolution, directing the Secretary of the Treasury (Mr. Hamilton) to report to them upon the subject of manufactures, and particularly as to the means of promoting such as would tend to render the United States independent of foreign nations for military and other essential supplies; and his report was submitted in December, 1791, wherein he said:

"The expediency of manufactures in the United States, which was not long since deemed very questionable, appears at this time to be pretty generally admitted."—P. 125.

And again he said:

"A provision has been made hence—the constitutional right of the Government of the United States to apply this species of encouragement, [to manufactures,] but there is certainly no good foundation for such a question."—P. 136.

And again he said:

"It is not uncommon to meet with an opinion, that, though the promoting of manufactures may be the interest of a part of the Union, it is contrary to that of another part. The northern and southern regions are sometimes represented as having adverse interests in this respect. Those are called manufacturing, these agricultural States; and a species of opposition is imagined to subsist between the manufacturing and agricultural interests."

"Ideas of a contrariety of interests between the northern and southern regions of the Union are, in the main, as unfounded as they are mischievous. The diversity of circumstances on which such contrariety is usually predicated, authorizes a directly contrary conclusion. Mutual wants constitute one of the strongest links of political connexion; and the extent of these has a natural proportion to the diversity in the means of mutual supply. Suggestions of an opposite complexion are ever to be deplored, as unfriendly to the steady pursuit of one great common cause, and to the perfect harmony of all its parts."—P. 134. (See State Papers, Finance, vol. 1, pages 125, 134, and 135.)

These were the doctrines of Washington, and of Washington's Administration. And now hear Washington again!

Extract of a speech of George Washington, President of the United States, to Congress, Dec. 7, 1796.

"Congress have repeatedly, and not without success, directed their attention to the encouragement of manufactures. The object is of too much consequence not to insure a continuance of their efforts in every way which shall appear eligible."

Hear Jefferson!

Extract of a message from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Congress, Nov. 8, 1808.

"The suspension of our foreign commerce, induced by the hostile acts of the belligerent Powers, (of Europe,) and the consequent losses and sacrifices of our citizens, are subjects of just concern. The situation into which we have thus been forced, has impelled us to apply a portion of our industry and

capital to the extent of this act remains that under the auspices of freedom of duties and protection.

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