

the popular sentiment. With the exception of a very few hasty articles in the English newspapers, provoked possibly by that tone of denunciation so loudly proclaimed by members in both houses of Congress, scarcely one ground of provocation can be urged, and the war passed by the American government. In the history of mankind, not from a land it would be impossible to point out a nation more anxious to govern than the English are at the present moment to remain that country. Peace, and more especially with America. If the last ruling passion of it, then, must be assented to, we have here, as on the great lakes and the banks of the St. Lawrence, right on our side."

Mr. President, it has been a fortunate thing with England always to act as though she had right on her side. A nation acting on this principle will seldom fail of success. If we will now act on the same principle, we cannot fail to maintain our rights. In the Union of sentiment and co-operation with the English and Oregonative, by the co-ordinate departments of government, will vindicate our national character, and serve our interests. Their preservation will not lead to war, if England is not more desirous of dispossessing us of what is ours than a nation should professing such moderation. I sincerely hope we may never attempt, on this continent, to enact scenes of the St. Lawrence, or give a similar exhibition of her political moderation.

I cannot concur with a distinguished senator in the opinion, that the public sentiment is changing, and coming day by day more favorable to the establishment of the 49th parallel as the boundary between two countries. I entertain no such apprehensions; but if I did, I would vote for this resolution, because it would more readily enable us to arrive at adjustment of the difficulties. So long as the treaty of 1818 continues in force we have no reason to suppose that the controversy will be terminated; and it is proper that our citizens in the Oregon territory should be protected. Numbers have already migrated there, and numbers more have it in contemplation to follow them. Until something is done, as an evidence of our regard for these pioneers, their situation must be exceedingly inefficient, as well as insecure. We should not predicate measures in relation to them upon the expectation of British inactivity, or the hope of negotiation, with the belief that England will slumber while our people are to occupy the territory. England never slumbers, more especially when her commercial interest is at stake; and her whole history warrants the conclusion that she never will, so long as the power remains with her to extend or establish her dominion.

What sort of policy would it be, as suggested, to encourage our people to remove to Oregon, and remain there without assurance of safety, surrounded by Indians under British control? It has been said that we have induced them to go there. If so, could not their situation claim our peculiar regard? A honorable senator has said, he would be in favor of giving protection to our settlers, but he is undecided as to the manner in which that protection could be given. He says it should be done with caution, and accomplished gradually. He is never ceasing to favor of protecting their personal rights, but he permits them to build the policy of extending our political jurisdiction over the territory. For my part, I cannot delude our people how the United States could extend to them personal protection, and, at the same time, advocate political protection; for without political, no assumption of personal protection cannot be extended to them. As Hermoders now stand, they cannot settle north of the Columbia river. If they attempt it, they are seduced by bribery or driven by menaces to remove south of that river. England, if need be, will

strengthen herself in Oregon. She has troops there, armed and disciplined, if she has not an agricultural population such as ours. In the mean time, what course has been recommended to us by the distinguished senator? To encourage our people to go into the territory until by-and-by the whole country shall fall into our possession. And this is an exemplification of the policy of inactivity. If their's, would it not be filching their territory? Would it not be obtaining by indirection that which we dare not claim as a just right?

Why, sir, if we have no right to it now, we would have no right to it then. If it is their's by occupation or discovery, it would still be their's by the same right.

If we have rights at all to the territory, they are substantive, and do not depend upon anything short of a just assumption of them. Sir, we should act with such policy as to enable us to secure our rights in question as occasion may require, and to that end I would recommend a fair and just, but at the same time firm and decided course.

I trust in my opinions upon this subject, I am actuated by no unworthy prejudices against England, or in favor of our own country. To Great Britain I do not intend the slightest reproach or disrespect. On the contrary, in many respects I much admire the glory of her character. I approve many of her institutions. I admire the character of the English people, for they are generous and magnanimous. I admire their loyalty to their government, and I admire the gentlemanly bearing of their representatives abroad. For these reasons I can entertain no improper prejudice, nor desire a collision between the two nations. Were it in my power, I would not impose injustice upon England. But at the same time I assert that towards her I would act without reference to the power she may possess. In this case we should act independent of all apprehensions of that power. We should take measures for ourselves, and, pursuing justice, treat her as though she had not a fortress on land, or a sail on the ocean.

If the fear of offending England should dictate our policy, we would be driven, as I have before remarked, to concession after concession, until our boundaries would be curtailed, and we should be reduced within the limits of the good old thirteen States. We might expect trench after trench upon the extent of our territory, until we would be driven in from every outpost of the republic. Whatever is justly hers, at the expense of great national inconvenience, I would say let her have it, if we could not obtain it by the exchange of a fair equivalent. We should always bow to the majesty of principle. But in this case, until the rights of England are clearly ascertained and defined, I should be inclined to believe that our right to the territory in question was by no means inferior to that which she has assumed.

I will not, Mr. President, attempt a discussion of the subject of boundary, because I consider it unnecessary, if not improper. That question does not arise out of the resolution before the Senate, but would necessarily be appropriated to the diplomatic action of the two governments. Nor shall I now indicate what would be my course should a treaty be negotiated and submitted by the President. I think any avowals beforehand would tend, more or less, to increase the difficulties which at present exist in relation to the adjustment of the difficulty. Why? Because they tend but to make England more wary. They are calculated to induce her to