

to-day—the events that gave rise to the famous utterance of the leader of the opposition (Mr. Meighen) “Ready, aye, Ready”? The Armistice agreement signed between the Allies and Turkey on October 30, 1918, might be considered as a starting point from which to trace very briefly the change of events which led to the war with Turkey. Then on August 10, 1920, the Allies submitted a proposal to Turkey and Greece. This proposal intended as a peace treaty was signed at Sèvres. I am aware I have not pronounced the word correctly; but I was afraid to say it right because hon. members might have thought I was talking about a sieve. I want to comment on this matter. Is it apparent to hon. gentlemen that this was the only parliament concerned that ratified the treaty of Sèvres? The treaty itself, which I presume, we have all read, was so monstrous that no other nation would dare to put its name to it. But Canada hastened with her signature to ratify it. Now what does this indicate? It indicates to me the complete ignorance of Canadian parliamentarians of international matters.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Some of them.

Mr. IRVINE: It indicates to me the complete failure of this consultation policy which has been and is in practice between Canada and Great Britain. I do not of course mean to impute any weakness or lack of knowledge to Canadian parliamentarians; how could they possibly know anything about such a treaty? I will show before I am through that it is impossible for any of us to know anything about it unless we make a special study of the whole thing from sources of information other than that which comes through consultation. However, to continue with the events which led to the war. Proposals were again submitted in March 1921 and these were in turn refused by Greece, and fighting between Turkey and Greece went on. This was the situation during the sitting of the Imperial conference of 1921. But what did that conference do to clarify the situation? It did nothing, or at least if it did anything we do not know what it was. It never intimated what it had done, and so I think I am generous in concluding that it accomplished nothing. But even if it had done something, that result would very speedily have been frustrated as subsequent events would have made inevitable; for on October 20, 1921, France upset the whole international apple cart by arranging a separate peace treaty with Turkey. Then relations between France and the United Kingdom became unsettled and

uncertain. Afterwards, in the following March, a new set of proposals were submitted which Turkey refused to accept, with the result that fighting proceeded between Greece and Turkey. The situation became alarming and Mr. Churchill despatched his most famous manifesto; that was the occasion on which he was very anxious that Canada should render assistance if necessary. But there was not the same anxiety to invite Canada to assist at Lausanne when they were making the treaty now under discussion; Canada was all right to do the fighting but she should have no part in the negotiations. And so followed a series of swiftly moving events. What could our Imperial conference do with a situation of that kind? It sat in 1921 when this question was acute; it saw the facts as they took place. How ridiculous it is to suppose that a policy of consultation by conferences could do anything intelligent with such a situation. I would suggest to the leader of the opposition that if he wants to adhere to the policy of consultation he arrange with European diplomacy not to diplomitize until our conference has sat upon the question concerned. That might afford some means of solving the problem. Otherwise it seems to me pretty hopeless. But let me press this point: To what extent was Canada consulted in these matters to which I have referred? What did Canada know about them? How far were we responsible for the blundering policies involved? You will find if you study this matter that the conferences were just as futile in the matters they considered as they were in the matters which they did not consider at all. As an example of that I want to place before the committee, particularly, the British policy in Egypt. I must not go into a very elaborate description of this, because of course the hour is late and no doubt hon. members are thoroughly acquainted with the matter. The policy very roughly speaking was that the protectorate should be abandoned as the result of a certain bargain which the British ambassadors sought to bring into effect.

Mr. McMASTER: With whom?

Mr. IRVINE: With Turkey. This policy of abandoning the protectorate in Egypt as a part of the bargain was agreed to by the Imperial conference of 1921. Here is the quotation from the proceedings of the conference which will substantiate that point.

Mr. McMASTER: The conference of 1921?

Mr. IRVINE: Yes.