

not keep our self-respect and it would be a good thing for Britain to feel that in her righteous wars—if they should ever come and they sometimes will—she would have the backing and interest of her colonies behind her, and would have distinctive cohorts of those colonies fighting in her ranks under the flag for the common benefit. If that is a benefit to the empire at large, it is equally a benefit to us here in Canada to feel that whilst we give of our smallness to the extent of our ability in Britain's righteous wars, at our own will, voluntarily and only voluntarily, we will have in return for that the feeling that Britain and Britain's colonies stand side by side with Canada in any just and righteous quarrel for offence or defence. Therefore, I think it would not have been a matter of insuperable difficulty to arrange for Canadian militiamen, being to a certain extent so drilled and so formed and so arranged by the rules and regulations here, that if that occasion ever arose as it did in 1899, there would be a body of 10,000 or 15,000 or 20,000 men, if Canada thought the quarrel just and if the Canadian soldiers desired to go, who would go to help Britain do what? Make herself strong for Canada's own defence, for it is absolutely true that the defence of the colonies is in proportion to the strength and power of the British empire as a whole, and when a part of it is menaced in any quarter of the world it weakens the defence of Canada and every other colony of the British empire. Now, 'them's my sentiments,' and I have given them in a rough way. This is my criticism and I still counsel the Minister of Militia to pare down in so far as the expense of the headpiece is concerned, not that we do not need it and need it efficient, but let us be very sure that we have not more of it and that it is not more expensive than we now require. Build up the body which actually does the fighting. You may have the highest paid officials possible; you may have the most splendid officials you can get, but that does not make the military spirit and fervour amongst our people. We have got to cultivate the militiaman himself, that is the body in which you have to evoke enthusiasm, and that you have to interest in the defence of your country. It is not altogether the best way to do this to make too expensive a headpiece for the military system of this country. I am sincerely sorry that we did not take the offer of the British government to keep up these two ports of Esquimalt and Halifax and I shall be extremely sorry if we do not put the best of and the strongest of our efforts on the line of the active militia and of the gun service necessary to make them effective.

One word more. I hope that permanent force will be kept down just as small as it possibly can be. We cannot keep a large standing army. If you keep 2,000 and if this is all that is necessary for your instruc-

tion, what great good is another thousand of expensive men who are kept within barracks all the year going to be? For fighting, for battle, they would amount to very little, but they would cost a great deal, and what you would spend on a couple of thousand permanent force, not absolutely necessary for teaching purposes, would go a long way towards filling up the ranks, the shadowy ranks at present, of that 100,000 active militia which everybody admits we ought to have.

Mr. WM. ROCHE (Halifax.) I am encouraged to offer one or two observations this afternoon, because yesterday afternoon I had the pleasure of hearing from my friend from East Grey certain observations which he said were not technical nor derived from any military knowledge, but simply from the observations of a man who had been accustomed to exert common sense. Of course those who have spoken on highly military topics dealing with all the technicalities belonging to that profession occupy a higher region than that any which we can hope to penetrate. But when it comes to common sense perhaps individuals conversant with the ordinary affairs of life may be able to offer some observations which will assist us in the formation of an opinion as to the practical means for the defence of the country in which we are all interested. I for one come from one of the places which have been mentioned, and I have had some opportunity of observing both the British army and the British fleet, and I have also heard a great deal about them in former times from those fully conversant with the operations of both army and navy. With regard to the observations of the hon. member for North Toronto (Mr. Foster) he is the exponent of a new system of tactics. He has said a great deal about the expensiveness of the head, that it is too far in advance of the body, &c. Of course my friend is alive and he has a great advantage over others who have preceded him and who are dead. But if I remember there is one who was considered quite an adept in war and something also of an expert in tactics, that was Emperor Napoleon. He said: Good God, my victories were all made in my head. I had carried at the end of my arm my head and I gained my victories whilst the others were going about; all my attacks were formed in my own mind and executed mechanically by others whom I had intrusted with the duty of carrying out my instructions. My hon. friend said that safety consisted in defence.

Well, the authority I have quoted, said that safety always consisted in being the attacking party—be the first to begin the battle. Now, referring to modern history, which is within our ken, I would ask my hon. friend from North Toronto on what part of the Boers' land they conducted their defence. I would ask him in what part of the Japanese territory the defence of the