

to play the ethnic and/or nationalistic card, when they are given a 'golden parachute' out (Snyder 2000). In post-colonial Asia, authoritarian governments may successfully argue to their majority populations that international pressure for the prosecution of those accused of grievous human rights abuses, and the movement for an international criminal court, are thinly disguised Western neo-colonialism. They are more likely to make such arguments when fearful of the consequences of democratization for their personal well-being.

However, there is also evidence that complete impunity for authoritarian leaders believed responsible for human rights abuses against minority groups and others makes it difficult to achieve the reconciliation required for democracy to work in culturally divided societies. Taiwan's transition to democracy was largely peaceful, and fostered a relatively inclusive definition of citizenship, in part because key GMT leaders have been willing to atone for their inappropriate measures, while key opposition leaders have been willing to forgive. The failure of Indonesian governments meaningfully to address grievances connected with past and ongoing human rights abuses by the military fuels the independence movement in Aceh.

In this context, made-at-home processes of reconciliation rooted in local cultural norms and accepted as legitimate by a broad cross section of local moral opinion leaders are likely to be more effective than those imposed by foreign governments or multilateral organizations. The Cambodian and Indonesia court actions against those accused of human rights abuses under the Khmer Rouge and Suharto governments respectively illustrate the dangers of such an approach when those accused of human rights violations remain powerful. However, solutions to this problem should be sought within the country itself, discretely and creatively supported from the outside, so that the end results retain strong local legitimacy.

Finally, the parties to ethnic conflicts will be less willing and able to make symbolic and material concessions if outside states are seen as painting one party as the villain and the other as a victim, or to favour one side over the other. Whatever the culpability perceived by outside policy-makers, they need to recognize that ethnic conflicts are fuelled by the sense of grievance, real or imagined, of both minorities and majorities. Left unrecognized and addressed on either side, this sense of grievance can fuel extremist ethno-nationalist political parties, which undermines democracy.

**Multiple and cross-cutting cleavages:** A society with more ethnic-diversity and with cross-cutting cleavages will be more likely to develop and consolidate democratic institutions. In India, the presence of multiple cleavages that cross-cut religious, linguistic, caste, and class lines have contributed to that country's considerable inter-ethnic peace. (The ethnic conflicts marring its record are attributable, not to democracy, but to an absence of local democracy or to authoritarian central government policies.) Federalism contributed to the cross-cutting of cleavages in India because, in making boundary adjustments to create a larger number of more homogeneous linguistically based states, demands for religiously based states were rejected. Multiple, cross-cutting cleavages also makes it difficult for any party to impose a lasting and exclusionary policy