

(b) Planning and Organization

One view was that planning and organization were essential elements of the development of a capability for chemical warfare and should therefore be banned. Another view held that a ban on planning and organization would be practically impossible to verify and hence hard to enforce; in any event it would not be needed if other elements were successfully banned.

(c) Training

Some delegations held the view that, since it was difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive training, all training should be prohibited; others believed that training in protective measures would contribute to deterring possible violations of a convention and, therefore, should be allowed; still others thought that protective training should be permitted at least until all stocks of chemical weapons were destroyed.

(3) Issues relating to specific items, subject to agreed definitions, that could be prohibited under a convention:

(a) Means of/facilities for production.

The issue of what specific types of means of/facilities for production would fall under the prohibition was not examined in depth.

(b) Biochemical warfare agents.

Some held that potential biochemical warfare agents that fall in the so-called grey area between biological and chemical warfare agents should be prohibited. The issue was not the subject of further examination.

(4) Issues relating to the criteria that could be used as the basis in determining the scope of the prohibition:

(a) There were differing views regarding the relative importance of the various criteria mentioned in paragraph 10.A.(3) above.

(b) With reference to toxicity criteria, although several approaches for defining toxicity were discussed-- including quantitative, qualitative, descriptive and nominative -- no attempt was made to narrow the issue to a particular approach or combination of approaches.