

### Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures

This is a small and very specific category of Confidence-Building Measures. The conduct measures outlined in this small set of proposals are closely related to the information measures noted at the beginning of this discussion. Their basic purpose is primarily educational rather than inspection *per se*. The idea is to establish common rules of conduct for both military observers and their hosts at military manoeuvres. This category appears to be similar to the Inspection Measures category of the Constraint CBMs but is conceptually distinct in that the activities observed are not in any way constrained and the observation is primarily educational. This suggests the fundamental distinction between the two basic groups of Confidence-Building Measures – some are devoted to acquiring information about certain military activities (and, less directly, intentions) while others have to do with actual constraints (defining or confirming them) on certain military activities.

The conduct measures are derived from experience gained with the original Helsinki CBM provisions. Those provisions stated that

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

1. **Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Proposals.** On the basis of the disappointing experience with the Helsinki CBMs, several proposals have been advanced containing fairly detailed discussions of how manoeuvre observers ought to be treated. Some call for the removal of the almost totally voluntary character of existing measures and suggest a mandatory invitation to all notifiable manoeuvres. Beyond this basic requirement, the proposals argue for the provision of adequate opportunities to actually witness relevant parts of real manoeuvres rather than small staged events which convey no honest information. The

proposals also call for the provision of adequate information about the purpose of the manoeuvre and the course of its conduct, the provision of or allowance for the necessary equipment to actually observe a manoeuvre (i.e. the right of observers to bring their own field glasses), the opportunity to meet with participating troops and their commanders, freedom from harassment and limited freedom of movement within the manoeuvre area. Such proposals could also contain clear understandings of observer responsibilities to ensure that illicit intelligence gathering isn't encouraged. The negotiation of an "observers' code of conduct" would certainly be useful and some measure of improvement over existing conditions is possible. It is questionable, however, whether the Soviet Union and its allies would be willing to permit what to them would seem to be radical freedoms for military observers at manoeuvres. It is worth pursuing but not at the expense of more important (and intrusive) Confidence-Building Measures.

### Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs

This general grouping of Confidence-Building Measures is the second and more demanding type of CBM. While the first group is composed of information, communication and education measures, the second involves relatively intrusive inspection measures as well as actual constraints on troop or equipment deployment. The inspection and deployment constraint measures generally go hand in hand, the former confirming compliance of the latter. Also included in this basic type of CBM is a small and specific category containing non-interference measures. As was noted earlier, this second grouping of Confidence-Building Measures does *not* include any verification activities *per se*. Instead, these CBMs include measures designed to *facilitate* the unilateral determination that certain, specified undertakings (primarily constraint measures) are being honoured. This may seem to be a controversial interpretation. The reason for making this very deliberate distinction has to do with the inherently unilateral character of verification and the inherently mutual character of Confidence Building.

