

improve the quality of the allied "shield" forces and their state of combat-readiness, SACEUR has frequently found it psychologically more expedient to refer them to Canadian, rather than only to U.S. forces, as a model. The presence of non-German forces in the front rank may also enhance NATO's "controlling" and stabilizing functions in future. By providing tangible front-line evidence of NATO's interdependence the presence of these forces can be said to form an integral part of the present nuclear deterrence which derives its legitimacy as much from psychological and political as from military factors.

The decision about Canada's future military role in Europe cannot, therefore, be made on the basis of exclusively military criteria. On the other hand, Canadian authorities cannot ignore that a contribution to the political and psychological aspects of the deterrent will not be made by mere military "representational" functions, that is to say by substituting symbolism for military effectiveness. The cause of deterrence will not be served unless forces are fully identified with the strategic concepts of the Alliance and equipped for their specific role as part of this strategy. A situation will therefore have to be avoided where, according to the Minister of National Defence: "The brigade was becoming a borderline case because of its lack of up-to-date equipment. It was questionable whether it was fulfilling Canada's commitment to NATO." ¹³

A more significant contribution perhaps to the overall deterrence posture of the Alliance than that provided by the presence of Canadian forces in Europe may have been made by Canada's participation in NORAD, whose primary goal is the protection of the American retaliatory force and thus constitutes the very essence of the continued credibility of the deterrent. While the North American continent is part of the NATO area, the Alliance exercises no planning or control functions over NORAD. Unless Canada assumes major research and operational duties in the defence of the North American continent against the threat of ICBMs and nuclear submarines, the importance of the Canadian role in this vital sector will decline with the waning of the bomber threat.

The Atlantic Alliance can also be said to draw indirect benefits from the war-preventive nature of Canada's peace-keeping activities even though these are neither conducted under the auspices of the Alliance nor, Cyprus excepted, within the NATO area. Partly owing to the general problem of co-ordinating NATO activities in relation to the "third world", and partly as the consequence of differences among allies in their evaluation of UN peace-keeping functions, ranging from Portugal's general hostility to French and Belgian criticism of one particular peace-keeping effort, no satisfactory way has yet been found to transfer these "credits" to the ledger of Canada NATO contributions. Canada's success in this form of international activity and her useful credentials in the field of arms control and inspection have justified this plea for flexibility and diversity in the workings of the Alliance. In order to utilize the specific qualifications of different allies, a certain division of roles and of labour is necessary, all the more as nuclear conditions have on the one hand enlarged the technical limitations of non-nuclear powers, while paradoxically imposing greater restrictions on the freedom of action and options available to nuclear powers than apply to non-nuclear powers.

¹³ Cited in the Montreal Star, December 18, 1963.