

2. He foresaw two main possibilities: (a) that rebellion would be quickly crushed, or (b) that it would continue in an inconclusive way in tradition of other Cuban revolutions.

3. On question of USA involvement, Adlai Stevenson stressed that neither he nor his delegation had been in any way in touch with Cuban revolutionary movement. They did not repeat not know what their plans were either before event or in future. He recalled, as he had said in committee, that USA was morally in support of movement. He did not repeat not deny that there had been recruitment and training on USA soil, but this, he explained, was in tradition of attitude of one American state to another in long history of revolutions and counter-revolutions.

4. Stevenson went on to recall, however, that what USA faced in fact was Soviet intervention in Cuba in form of supply of arms and equipment to Castro and establishment of a Soviet-type state in Cuba itself. This, he explained, was the purpose of his statement the previous night, when he dwelt upon internal developments in Cuba, particularly in last few months, including changing of Cuban educational system.

5. Of the various resolutions that have been put forward, USA was only in favour of draft by seven Latin American states (AC1/L276).⁵ This was acceptable because it put emphasis on attempting to find a settlement through Organization of American States.

6. Minister explained that Canada's principal concern was not repeat not to have the conflict spread and that Canada could help in this situation by giving its support to Seven-Power Resolution.

7. Stevenson, referring to problem which would confront USA if rebellion failed, asked what Canada's view would be of direct military intervention in Cuba by USA.

8. Mr. Green said that this would be a very dangerous development; that he thought it would seriously prejudice the position of USA in eyes of Latin American states and of uncommitted nations of the world and put USA in the wrong in UN. Minister recalled how much good had come of the attitude adopted by the new Administration towards problems in UN and its relations with Latin American states. All this would be placed in jeopardy. Mr. Stevenson did not repeat not argue the answer he received.

9. In answer to a question from Mr. Nesbitt as to what might be the long-term effects on USA of a Castro victory, Mr. Stevenson said that this would be a serious blow to USA since it would be evident that USA was not repeat not able to follow up and give support to a cause to which they had given their moral support.

10. In conclusion Minister told Mr. Stevenson that Canadian delegation would support Seven-Power Resolution and speak to other delegations about lending their support also.

[H.C.] GREEN

⁵ Voir/See D.C. Watt, John Major, Richard Gott, and George Schöpflin, eds., *Document on International Affairs, 1961* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 26-27.