

the beleaguered illegal government of Haiti continues to resist the resolutions of the United Nations.

Robin Renwick has concluded that the coercive effect of sanctions is greatest when latent. The tendency of sanctions, once they have been declared, or even explicitly threatened, to coalesce collective resistance within the target state by generating a psychosis of "collective guilt" suggests that they should be conceived of as punitive, and imposed on defaulting states largely as a means of deterring other defaulters. The abandonment of sanctions against Italy in 1936 because they had failed to stop the Italian invasion of Ethiopia was a mistake in this regard, one which has been avoided by the United States in the post war period. The protracted sanctions imposed unilaterally on Cuba and Vietnam by the United States, and the ongoing sanctions against Iraq, maximize the deterrent capacity of sanctions, although it may be argued that unilateral action is itself a threat to world peace.⁴⁸

Although there is some evidence that sanctions had an impact on decision-making in the Republic of South Africa, in an intractable conflict such as the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, it may be that the punitive role of sanctions is the most that can be expected. Economic considerations are clearly not the driving force in the crisis, and it may well be that the only real value of sanctions is the warning provided to possible future transgressors. In the short term, many Balkan peoples will suffer because of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on Serbia and Montenegro, but in the longer term the effect of the sanctions on the behaviour of other states may prove beneficial. As with any measure of prevention, however, it will be difficult or impossible to demonstrate with any degree of confidence that violations of international peace have indeed been deterred by such examples.

The relative failure of economic sanctions as a coercive force has shifted the emphasis of United Nations efforts to what amounts to economic warfare, or quasi-warfare. The centre piece in this strategy, of course, has been embargoes placed on the sale of arms, and on the transfer of advanced technology. In the case of South Africa, the inability to replace damaged or worn military aircraft appears to have been influential in bringing a change in South African foreign policy, leading to a withdrawal of forces from

⁴⁸ Robin Renwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-92. Kim Richard Nassal contrasts the juridical role of sanctions under the League, which he characterized as "punishment" for violations of international law, with the political role of sanctions by the United Nations as acts of coercion, but this distinction does not affect the historical observation about the actual role of sanctions. See "Economic Sanctions in the League of Nations and the United Nations", in David Leyton-Brown, The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 7-22.