

For the purpose of the following analysis, a comprehensive definition of chemical agents such as that given in CD117, which includes the use of any toxic effect on plants, animals or man in warfare, has been assumed.

ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITY REQUIREMENTS FOR VERIFICATION AND CONTROL

A. Activities to be Undertaken and Monitored

1. Declaration of existing agent and chemical weapon production facilities including specific sites. Should any nation declare production facilities for agents or weapons, their existence would not likely be doubted. Remote confirmation of the declaration may be possible by "National Technical Means" (satellite) which is available to the Superpowers but not to others. No other technical means of verification would be in place at that time. To provide a minimum confirmation to all nations, some on-site visits would be necessary. An inspection team including national and international personnel (non-technical) would be required to meet within the declaring nation, select one declared site at random, and visit it to confirm the accuracy of the declaration. Visits to all declared sites would be highly desirable, but not essential. Such on-site inspection should not put the host nation at risk, since it is unlikely that site or process information beyond that released in the original declaration would be observed. In fact, the visit should serve to demonstrate the good faith of that nation to the world.

2. Declaration of existing agent and weapon stocks including storage sites and numbers. Verification requirements would be identical to those for production facilities. A random visit by non-technical staff to confirm weapon quantities at one site would be an essential minimum requirement. This should include both national and international personnel. The deliberate non-declaration of some existing stocks (or production facilities) would be a violation of the agreement, but this could not be detected by any technical means including on-site visits, and means to do so should not be required of a treaty. Cover-ups might be exposed by "National Technical Means" which would then require a challenge mechanism. Hidden stocks would also be covered by bans on retention and stockpiling and eventually on use of chemical weapons in warfare and would be subject to verification mechanisms required to monitor those activities.

3. Dismantling of existing production facilities. All production facilities for agents and weapons should be dismantled. General agreement seems to have been reached that conversion to other uses would generally not be cost effective and in many instances would not be practical. Dismantling is also the only way to ensure that the facilities could not be rapidly reconverted to agent production and it eliminates the requirement for continued verification of the site. While dismantling toxic agent plants may be hazardous, it should not be technologically complex. It is suggested that any nation declaring such facilities should be able to dismantle them within five years. It may be possible to observe dismantling by satellite (national technical means) but by no other remote means. Satisfactory international verification