

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper explores the nature of an International Verification Organization which could oversee the implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention. The intention is to bring into focus an understanding of the obligations that the verification provisions place on States Parties to the Convention. Such provisions necessitate that personnel from the Technical Secretariat inspect stockpiles, chemical weapons destruction facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, and the civilian chemical industry in order to ensure that signatories are fulfilling their obligations. The analysis of the various verification projects leads to a description of the skills and personnel needed by an International Verification Organization (IVO), providing a basis for estimates of the resources needed by this sub-organ of the Consultative Committee.

The approach used in this work was that of a "Systems Study", as a qualitative variant of a "Systems Analysis." The systems analysis approach involves a rigorous, step by step procedure for selecting a 'best' solution to a problem, with the first step being a clear identification of the problem. In this case, the problem of defining the nature of an IVO was found to be so broad or 'fuzzy' that it was not amenable to such rigorous treatment. Consequently, a systems study approach was adopted, utilizing the formal steps of the systems analysis approach wherever applicable.

The study began with a review of the documents submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (and its predecessors) on the attributes of a Technical Secretariat or International Verification Organization. Such papers are few; it was often necessary