

employee trained to identify military organization and equipment) and a liaison officer representing the party to be inspected. Each inspection took the form of a brief meeting with a ranking officer of the unit to be inspected who reported on the status of personnel and controlled weapons in the sector and on any major shift in the location of accountable units. This meeting was followed by a visual check of accountable vehicles, weapons and personnel. Each of the three inspection team members recorded his or her own account of controlled items. Beyond providing a triple check on accountable items, this procedure reduced the likelihood of having the count challenged later by Egyptian or Israeli authorities.³¹

The Israeli technical sites in the Interim Buffer Zone were inspected on a monthly basis. SFM teams flew directly to the sites where they counted personnel, and inspected operation areas and defensive positions.³²

SFM aerial reconnaissance of Zones A and B (Egypt) was conducted over a two-day period, prior to a scheduled on-site inspection. The northern part of the two zones was surveyed on the first day with the remainder surveyed the following day. While aircraft normally flew at altitudes of 244 to 305 metres, inspection teams often undertook "close look" surveillance of various military formations and installations.³³ Significantly, landings during reconnaissance missions were not permitted except at designated refuelling points. Egypt and Israel, in accordance with Treaty stipulation, could only fly reconnaissance missions over Zones A and D respectively.

Wherever possible, the same SFM personnel carried out both the low-level aerial reconnaissance and the on-site inspection of the same sector during a given inspection cycle, thereby pro-

viding increased familiarity with the location of units and weapons being inspected. To counter problems of over-familiarity and complacency, however, assignments were rotated to give personnel a wider array of experience in all aspects of the verification process.³⁴ Finally, to ensure strict accountability, formal debriefings of all inspection personnel were held after each inspection. Using the various team reports, the SFM Operations Unit prepared a consolidated report of the inspection results, including a tabulation of personnel and weapons counts. Standardized reporting ensured that both parties received only the information necessary to verify Treaty compliance. This approach helped the SFM avoid allegations of "probing" for the purpose of military intelligence gathering.

4(c) *The Compliance Record: 1979-82*

Differences in Egyptian and Israeli military organization and structure created problems of interpretation over the nature of a "division", "allowable" fortifications and differences between "mortars" and "artillery pieces". For example, Israel claimed that Egypt had reinforced mechanized infantry divisions in Zone A, a formation Israel regarded as contrary to a "normal" mechanized infantry division. However, since Egypt did not exceed limitations on weapons and personnel, the SFM recognized the Egyptian version of a "division".³⁵ Issues of interpretation pertaining to distinctions between mortars and artillery pieces (160 mm mortars were classified as artillery pieces) and the number and location of field fortifications were resolved by the SFM and, where necessary, by the parties themselves in various meetings of the Liaison System. The Liaison System was established under Article VII of Annex 1 of the Peace Treaty to take effect upon the dissolution of the Joint Commission of the Sinai II Agreement. It was intended to assess progress in implementing the obligations assumed under the annex, to

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

