

This facility would be subject to special verification measures. While a party may transfer such chemicals for protective purposes to another party, the amounts of such transfers are limited, and such chemicals may not be transferred to a non-party State or re-transferred to a third State. If a party transfers such chemicals for protective purposes, it must declare these transfers.

Thus, as is clear from paragraph 8 of article II, the United States believes that permitted activities should include those related to peaceful uses of chemicals in our chemical industries and to protective activities. Paragraph 8 also includes as a "permitted purpose" any military purpose that does not make use of the chemical action of a toxic chemical to cause death or injury. This is an important, but relatively technical exception, which permits, for example, the military to use a toxic chemical as a rocket fuel. This provisions would not provide a party with a capability for chemical warfare, since the chemicals involved are not suitable for this purpose.

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The information contained in the declarations would not only be necessary to help the Consultative Committee in determining which locations and facilities on the territory of a party would be subject to systematic international on-site verification. It would also help specify those facilities and chemical stocks that will have to be destroyed under the provisions of articles V and VI of the draft convention. These articles require a party to destroy all of its chemical weapons and all of its chemical weapons production facilities.

Along with the initial declaration concerning its chemical weapons, a party must submit a detailed plan for their destruction, including the locations and manner of their destruction, schedules of quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed, and the end-products of the destruction process. Pursuant to article V, destruction of chemical weapons must begin not later than 12 months and finish not later than 10 years after the convention enters into force. This destruction process would be subject to systematic international on-site verification, including the continuous presence of inspectors and the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments. In accordance with article V, a party would also be required to make annual reports concerning the implementation of its destruction plan.

Paragraph (1) (E) of article V provides that the destruction of chemical weapons is to be controlled by a time-table contained in annex II. This time-table is not specified in the United States draft and needs to be the topic of negotiations here in the Conference on Disarmament. It is vital that the time-table for the destruction of chemical weapons be such that, during the destruction period, no State can gain a military advantage over another due to the pace of its destruction activities. The negotiation of this time-table will require the consideration of many factors to achieve a fair and balanced result. Because of the importance of this time-table to a party's national security, it is necessary that it be specified before the convention is opened for signature. We cannot delay consideration of this crucial provision of the convention until after entry into force, as some have suggested. I urge delegations to begin to examine this basic issue.

Before leaving this subject of destruction of chemical weapons, I would like to discuss one other issue. Some delegations have urged that diversion of chemicals contained in chemical weapons to permitted purposes be allowed in addition to destruction. The United States has opposed the concept of diversion, primarily because of concerns about how to verify that the items involved are not placed in clandestine chemical weapons stockpiles. Clearly, additional, very intrusive verification measures would be necessary to ensure that such a prohibited action was not taking place. In