

its seeds are scattered into many souls, and it attracts notice if it does not gain recognition. By-and-by its utility or applicability is tested, and it is found to be most answerable to man's necessities. But it is slow work at the best.

Galileo opened the eye of man to the exhaustless glories of the sky, and found rough inquisition given to his discoveries. Newton endeavoured to construct a tenable theory of light, but his prescience was denied, and debate waxed fierce regarding the accuracy of his views. Into what domicile of learned thinking was the Baconian logic introduced without irate opposition and debate? What universities welcomed the economy of Smith, the jurisprudence of Bentham, or willingly exchanged the study of alchemy for that of chemistry? Every fresh truth has its period of contest to undergo; men are not ready, notwithstanding the experience of all the ages, to acknowledge the likelihood of their being in error. They look on those who teach new truths as enemies; treat them as aliens, not as prophets and brethren.

It will ever be one of the nicest of problems for a man to solve, how far he shall profit by the thoughts of other men, and not be enslaved by them. Could the history of opinions be fully written, it would be seen how large a part in human proceedings the love of conformity—or rather the fear of non-conformity—has occasioned. It has triumphed over all other fears; over love, hate, pity, anger, pride, comfort, and self-interest. It has contradicted nature in the most obvious things, and has been listened to with the most abject submission. Its empire has been no less extensive than deep-seated. The serf to custom points his finger at the slave of fashion; as if it signified whether it is an old or a new thing which is irrationally conformed to. The man of letters despises both the slaves of fashion and of custom, but often runs his narrow career of thought, shut up, though he sees it not, within close walls which he does not venture to peep over. Some persons bend to the world in all things, from an innocent belief that what so many people think must be right. Others have a vague fear of the world, as of some wild beast which may spring out upon them at any time. In all things a man should beware of so conforming himself as to crush his nature and forego the purpose of his being. We must look to other standards than what men say or think. We must not abjectly bow down before rules and usages, but must refer to principles and purposes. In few words, we should think not whom we are following, but what we are doing. If not, why are we gifted with individual life at all.

We cannot in the practical affairs of life attain in all things, or even in many, the means of arguing with scientific accuracy; nor even when we have acquired absolutely scientific first principles can we develop their consequences and applications with invariable correctness and unmistakable rigour. Knowledge of a fact is distinct from the knowledge of reason. Science is reasoned truth. It cannot be false, and it must be impregnable. It can offer no alternative; it must determine what is true in sensuous perception, in ideal reproduction, in demonstrated sequence of law and result; for there is no science of the demonstrable until the reason can trace its principles and processes.

Knowledge is truth gained, science is truth ascertained, opinion is at the best only an approximation to truth, knowledge is the result of observation and experiment expended on facts and things. Science is the result of reasoning and reflectiveness on the facts of knowledge in the endeavour to discover the principles which regulate them, but opinion is a solution of the causes, occasions, effects, consequences, laws, and operations of facts not demonstrably known or irrefutably confirmed by experience. In knowledge, we judge without doubting; in opinion, with some mixture of doubt. Judgment extends to every kind of knowledge, probable or certain, and to every degree of assent or dissent. It extends to all knowledge as to all opinion; with this difference only, that in knowledge it is more firm and steady,—like a house founded upon a rock; in opinion it stands upon a weaker foundation, and is more likely to be shaken or overturned. The characteristic difference between knowledge and opinion is the unsteadiness, fluctuation, and undemonstrability of the latter, as compared with the trustworthy security and stability of the former.

In the formation of opinion, controversy is an excellent auxiliary; it rough-hews the material thought, and shows what is necessary that the eventual result may be satisfactory and acceptable; it compares and contrasts the outcome of the thinker's effort with similar or rival endeavours to substantiate it as a veritable addition to knowledge, faith and truth. Hence there is always a place for controversy in the world. Controversy not only tests old opinions, but tries new truths. It applies the touchstone of reason to all that is brought before it, and compels the old and the new alike to produce the evidence on which they rely for belief of what they advance.

Controversy is therefore the hope, the trust, the safeguard of every thinker. It preserves the vitality of all notable ideas, discoveries, and inventions. Controversy is examinative. Every opinion must be brought to the test, and only after due testing can it be passed on into the nature of received and ratified truth, so as to become science. Hence the need of a constant habit of thoughtfulness in men, and hence the advisability of being furnished with a logic which is applicable to all the turns and windings of human thought, and suitable to the general wants of human life,—a life of reasoning thought.

THE OLD MASTERS—PARTING WORDS.

It is at all times more satisfactory to enter the lists of a controversy and fight an antagonist who has the courage to drop his *alias*, and to affix or sign his proper name to his thesis. Therefore, I am glad that I have no longer "an unknown opposite," one whom, by the law of arms, I am not bound to answer. Had I known in the beginning of the fray that the redoubtable *ex-Honorary* Secretary of the Art Association of Montreal, to whom the "ninnies in Art" have so long looked upon as an oracle, had written under the euphonical title of "Juan Mahpoh," I should have distrusted my ability, as I now do, to cope with so great an authority on the Fine Arts, and such a keen dialectician. Again, knowing Mr. Popham's powers as an advocate and special pleader, and that the ready ear of the Judges of the Superior Court was always given to his arguments, I should neither have hazarded an opinion nor expended a "most frenzied eloquence" upon the merits of the "*Jupiter in Judgment*," attributed to *Palma il Vecchio*, had I received any intimation that Mr. Popham was the "Daniel come to judgment" upon the "Old Masters."

Being now absolutely committed to my defense, I will dispassionately reply to Mr. Popham's letter, and endeavour to imitate the courtesy, and the delicacy he has exhibited in his attack upon myself, whilst I shall carefully avoid misquoting, mutilating, and misconstruing his sentences, liberties which he has (unintentionally, perhaps) employed relative to mine. I will take them in their proper sequence:—

"Mr. Barton Hill, the owner of these *productions*, and his champion, Mr. King, allege the pictures in question to be originals."

I have never alleged that the pictures submitted to the Council of the Art Association "for exhibition" were originals. Believing Mr. Hill to be a truthful gentleman, and that his statements relative to the history of "the pictures in question" were true, I visited the Art Gallery and examined the *Rubens*, the *Rembrandt*, the *Palma il Vecchio*, the *Correggio*, and the *Raphael* (to these pictures have my observations been chiefly, if not almost entirely, confined), and wrote what I thought about them, and I still maintain that they bear the characteristics of the artists to whom they are ascribed. I wrote as follows:—

"Without authoritatively pronouncing that these pictures by the Italian and Dutch Masters are genuine, yet I am seriously inclined to think they are so; and, by comparing them with the known copies in the lower lobby of the Art Gallery, I do not see any reason to doubt their originality. From all internal and external evidence, and despite the doubt that has been so freely thrown by some connoisseurs upon their authenticity, and their absence from catalogues, which are rarely, if ever complete, I iterate my belief in their genuineness, though I may not be willing to class them with the *chef d'œuvres* of the European Galleries."

I may be wrong, nevertheless I am glad to take the present opportunity to congratulate the Council upon its decision, because I believe that the exhibition of the pictures to which I have called especial attention will tend more to exalt the ideas and purify the taste of the people, and give them a greater knowledge of true Art, than the majority of the pictures hitherto exhibited under the auspices of the Art Association of Montreal.

"Mr. King says, that judging by the style of *Jupiter in Judgment*, there is positive external evidence that it is an original."

My words are these: "Judging from the style of this *Jupiter in Judgment*—of which there is positive external evidence that it is an original—I much doubt if any artist in Canada would consider it comparatively easy of imitation, and still more, I doubt if any one of them would have the temerity to copy or counterfeit it." The name *Jupiter in Judgment*, given to it by the present owner, is that which he received with the picture at the time of its coming into his possession; and if it had been called *The Gods and Goddesses in Nubibus*; or *Themis bringing the Gods to Council*, before they descend to take part in the Trojan war, I should have spoken or written about it under either of the names, without considering that I should have displayed my ignorance of *Lempriere* or the *Iliads* of Homer.

The wrong name will not detract from the beauty of the picture, a beauty which Mr. Popham is forced to admit, and more, that "it bears traces of originality," and is of "sufficient intrinsic merit to deserve especial study." Because he thinks he has discovered this *Palma il Vecchio* to be a copy of a *Rubens*, he has crowingly given a quotation from Colley Cibbers' version of Richard the Third, which he supposes will vanquish me. I refer him to Shakspeare himself, who says:

"What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet";

So this *Palma il Vecchio* will be beautiful even if it is improperly called so, and it will retain its "dear perfection," despite the persistent perversity with which Mr. Popham pursues it.

No one of the persons who have seen this picture, and with whom I have conversed on its merits, has hesitated to acknowledge his estimation of the genius displayed in its composition and harmonious colouring. I have been, from the moment I saw it, deeply impressed with its beauty, and hope the Council, notwithstanding the "troublesome precedent," will never refuse to exhibit such a work of art even if there be a doubt about its authenticity and correct nomenclature.