ation procedures envisaged in the draft treaty proved to be the focus of most concern, and there was strong support for the specifically-defined procedures Canda had formulated and presented in a working paper. The Canadian proposal involved: (a) a clear step-by-step procedure for detection, investigation and verification of suspected violations of the treaty; (b) international assistance for less-developed states lacking the capability or sophisticated equipment to ensure that the provisions of the treaty were being respected; and (c) the protection of the rights of coastal states on their continental shelves.

In the light of this criticism, the co-chairmen tabled a revised joint draft treaty in the CCD on April 23, 1970, which incorporated a number of significant changes in response to the demands of other governments, including most of the procedures outlined in the Canadian working paper on verification. However, the revised text omitted from the verification article a clause that provided for recourse to international procedures, including the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The purpose of this clause was to ensure that nations need not depend on the benevolence of others with advanced under-sea technological competence; and, taking into account the desirability of the treaty's gaining the widest possible adherence among member states of the United Nations, in particular among those less-developed states unable to rely on alliance arrangements for assistance in verification procedures, Canada urged the authors of the draft treaty to consider the reinstatement of this clause.

Further improvements were made in the final revised draft treaty tabled in the CCD by the co-chairmen on September 1, 1970. Although the verification article did not refer specifically to the Secretary-General, it provided for "international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter". The draft treaty was forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly, which commended it on December 7, 1970, by a vote of 104 to two, with two abstentions. Canada was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution. It is expected that the treaty will be opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington early in 1971.

Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW)

During 1970 the Geneva Disarmament Committee continued to discuss ways of strengthening and supplementing the Geneva Protocol of 1925 through measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. The debate centered on two main questions: (a) whether it was desirable to negotiate one comprehensive agreement covering both chemical and biological weapons as proposed in the draft convention sponsored by the Soviet Union or whether prohibitions of biological weapons should be promulgated separately as proposed in the British draft convention; and (b) whether it was possible to devise adequate verification procedures that were technically and politically acceptable. A number of countries, including Canada, contributed working papers on aspects of the extremely complex problem of verification of the production and

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