by declaring that Municipalities should no longer be compelled to tax themselves to pay for the administration of criminal justice,—that in time to come, it should be paid for out of the public funds. The words, *local taxation* and *public* or *general* funds, are manifestly suggestive of designed contrast in terms by the Legislature. In the *enacting part* of the first section, the same terms are employed, and rejecting the portion, making temporary provision for the years 1846 and 1847, the clause may be read thus:—"That the *whole* of the expenses of the administration of criminal justice shall, during every year after 1847, be paid out of the consolidated revenue fund of this Province, and so much of any law as may be inconsistent with this act is hereby repealed." No sentence or form of words can have more than one *true* sense,—to have two meanings is equivalent to having no meaning. And can we ask any other interpretation to be given to this enactment than that all lawful fees—all necessary expenses legally incurred in the prevention of crime, in the arrest, prosecution, and trial of criminal offenders before Courts and Functionaries thereto authorized should be paid out of the General Revenue fund? If we go beyond the bare words and seek to penetrate further into the intent . the Legislature, this interpretation will have additional support from the reason and objects of the law to which we before briefly referred.

The second section provides for the audit of accounts, and does not affect the question as to the scope of the act, but the third section it seems, is considered by the department of public accounts to limit the enactment in the first section. Acting upon this, that department has assumed the right to reject certain expenses in the administration of Justice, and to throw the payment thereof upon the Municipalities. It would appear that the admission and rejection of items is arbitrary; at all events, it is difficult to perceive where a sound discretion has been exercised, or what principles have guided to a conclusion. The observations submitted by the Inspector-General for the guidance of the Boards of Audit are, it is said therein, "believed to be conformable to the views of the Law officers of the Crown" upon the Act. If so we venture to assert, that these views are erroneous. We cannot suppose that the Act has ever been taken up as a whole, and the opinion of any Law officer of the Crown had upon it, and we strongly incline to think that "the Law officers of the Crown", would not be prepared to father the observations in question, or give it as their opinion, that a correct interpretation has been pronounced by the Inspector General's department. Opinions probably have been hastily given on *isolated* items, and may be, for aught we know, correct enough, but the document before us, of itself proves that no general principles have been laid down for the guidance of the department. We do not desire to find fault with the officers or the department; the fault lies in the system,—but we desire to show wherein we believe, justice has not been done to the Municipalities, in order that a remedy of some kind may be applied.

Let us look for a moment at the third section—it is as follows:—"The several heads of expenses mentioned in the schedule to this Act, shall be deemed expenses of the administration of justice within the meaning of this Act." It does not say the several heads, &c., *and no others*, but merely that certain specified *heads* shall be within the Act.

Qui hæret in litera hæret in cortice, is a sound maxim, but suppose we put aside for a moment considerations of a general character that should weigh in construction, and look at the *words* of this third section, we will in them find nothing repugnant to the broad and comprehensive terms of the first section, which as we before said, includes *all* expenses connected with the administration of criminal justice. So far from controlling or limiting the terms in the first section, it may with more show of reason be contended that the words of the third section *enlarge* their operation, and actually bring within the scope of the act certain expenses not properly belonging to criminal justice. There are no less than six items in the schedule authorising payment for certain services rendered in connection with Division Courts—Courts of purely *civil* jurisdiction. These would not come within the Act but for the third section, for certainly in no sense are they expenses connected with the administration of *criminal* justice. The third section, may, however, with more show of reason, be said to limit the *amount* payable without restraining the subject matter embraced under the general terms, "Administration of criminal justice;" and it certainly appears to do so in the case of the Gaoler's salary, "a proportion" only being chargeable against the General Revenue. But to our mind it is quite evident that the schedule,