perhaps two miles in fog. That is pretty good weather for an approach to, let us say, the airport at Quebec city. The wind is calm, and we on the Air Canada flight deck have been cleared for an ILS or instrument landing system approach. We have just changed to tower frequency on a radio which carries 380 frequencies on one of the radios on our flight deck. We call up the tower saying that this is Air Canada established on the ILS. The tower replies that we are number one. That means we are number one for landing.

● (2220)

Now you are over the outer marker and you want to tell the tower this, but you have to wait while the following conversation takes place between the tower and another aircraft.

Tower says: "Are you ready for immediate, United?"

United answers: "Affirmative".

Tower: "United, you are clear to position and hold", United being on the ground and being ready to taxi out for take-off.

You say: "Air Canada inside the marker gear down."

Tower answers: "Air Canada continue".

I am leaving out names and flights and numbers in this narrative because I am telling you something that actually happened in the air over Quebec air space on January 25 last.

At this point you do not know, on the Air Canada flight deck, which runway the other aircraft is occupying. Remember, the wind is calm. But you would not have to be very clever to at least suspect that the United flight is in front of you on the runway you are about to land on.

You say to the Tower: "We are down to 500 feet," and you call for landing clearance.

Tower comes back: "United clear for take-off; Air Canada clear to land."

As I say, Madam Speaker, this happened. As the tower says this you are passing through 400 feet, still in cloud through ILS approach. You have already decided, on the flight deck; you know the aircraft is there. You suspect it is on the same runway, and if it is there you are going to go around again.

At 300 feet you come out of cloud and get a view of the rear end of a 727 starting down the runway. You say to the first officer, "Go around." That does not go across to the tower. You say to the tower, after you have paused while your hands are busy in the cockpit on the go around: "Air Canada going around."

Tower pauses a few seconds during which Air Canada, with you on the flight deck, re-enters the cloud and you pass over the United flight.

Tower says: "United abort your take-off"—this said by a different voice than before.

In this instance all ended happily, but my point is that if you just change this scenario into a bilingual situation, remembering the seconds that you have with aircraft, and the combined approach cruising speed at 1,200 miles an hour in some situations—what if no one is prepared? Change that scenario into a two language situation, lower the limits a little bit, and instead of 400 feet you have 250 feet or 300 feet—you do not have two miles, you have one mile. Perhaps you have the makings of a disaster. Indeed you will.

The controller made an error in this situation. Anyone can make a mistake, but remove the ability of the other parties in airplanes to monitor air traffic at any airport and that mistake will not be known—it will not permit the captain of an airplane to analyse the situation and make decisions which might avoid a disaster.

This situation ended happily, but with a bilingual situation there would have been a major disaster. That is what is going to happen.

I speak only to the question of safety and I urge the government to reconsider very ill conceived policy of implementation of two languages in one of our provinces before a fatal disaster occurs—a fatal disaster for which only the government can be blamed.

Mr. Ralph E. Goodale (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Transport): Mr. Speaker, may I first address myself to my hon. friend's beginning remarks about this particular proceeding in the House of Commons being, to use his words, "a useless forum." We on this side do not consider it to be a useless forum. We take this so-called "late show" very seriously. I suppose my hon. friend does not, because unfortunately he is here so infrequently.

To deal with the matter which was mentioned in his actual question to which his notice referred today, which had to do with the possibility of restrictions on unilingual pilots as far as their licences go, this is the point to which I should like to address a few remarks this evening. It relates rather directly to what he has said this evening. I can assure him and all Canadians that there is no intention on the part of the government to impose any restriction on the pilot licences of either English-speaking or Frenth-speaking pilots flying in Canadian air space. In this connection it is the responsibility of every pilot to operate only within the limits of his competence, including that of language, as contained in paragraphs 504 and 817 of Air Regulations.

Specifically, paragraph 504 states that:

Prior to commencement of any flight, the pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall familiarize himself with all available information appropriate to the intended flight.

Paragraph 817 states that:

Nothing in these regulations shall be held to relieve the owner, operator or flight crew member of an aircraft of the consequences of any neglect in the use of lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper lookout, or neglect of any precaution that is required by the ordinary practice of the air or by the special circumstances of the case.

The portion of this paragraph which is relevant to the question before us this evening is the portion which reads:

. . . neglect of any precaution that is required by the ordinary practice of the air or by the special circumstances of the case.

Further, those occurrences to which my hon. friend referred as "near misses"—that is the American terminology while in Canada we use more technical language to refer to such occurrences as "loss of separation between aircraft"—may involve varying degrees of seriousness ranging from a technical loss of separation to more serious occurrences, but are not language problems per se.