

Russia, nuclear weapons have become more important as a tool for deterrence, perhaps even towards neighbours to the west. This challenges the norms and values at the core of the CFE, and potentially increases the risk of a failed balance of power. If controlling conventional weapons no longer matters due to the potential strategic use of nuclear weapons by Moscow, the future of the CFE is indeed in question. Fears in Russia about western nuclear capabilities on former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Republic territories influences Moscow's approach to current security issues, especially NATO enlargement.⁷⁴ As such, to allay fears in Moscow over nuclear policy, CFE enlargement, NATO enlargement, and nuclear weapons use and disarmament discussions must be ongoing, and conducted in parallel. Only then can long-term viability of the CFE, let alone peace and stability in Europe, be guaranteed.

On September 11th 2001, the international system changed. One of the main outcomes applicable to this discussion is the effects of shifting ideas about the value of international treaties, be they arms control or otherwise. The other outcome is the reevaluation of multilateralism, especially as used by the United States. While the ending of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) perhaps foreshadowed it, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington ushered in an era of American unilateralism. The overall military strategic shift from deterrence to pre-emptive strikes, mixed with unilateralism, forces one to question the viability of international arms control regimes. But these questions do not necessarily stem from American action. Rather, it is the interpretation of American action by both allies and adversaries about the usefulness of multilateral bargains in mitigating the security dilemma that affects the discussion here. If the international hegemon sets the parameters for acceptable action in the international system, then the precedent setting nature of its actions are important. If the precedent is for unilateral action and pre-emptive strikes, the lessons that others in the international system can learn is that "the ends justify the means," as what seems to have been the case in the aftermath of Kosovo and Russian military strategy.⁷⁵ If both the treatment of the ABM Treaty by Washington and American military strategy post-9/11 have the same effect on international treaties, which may have been reflected in the North Korean defection from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2002, are arms control treaties worth the paper they are written on?

To sum up the evaluation of the CFE Treaty, there is a significant level of community present. The treaty has proven itself flexible, apt to compromise between member differences, and has done so using rules based behaviour. There is little that seems to threaten the ability of the CFE Treaty area to continue to show characteristics of community, since the overall goals of the treaty are embedded in most member states. In those areas where values clash there has been compromise, all within the framework of intrusive inspections and detailed information sharing. As such it has mitigated the classical security dilemma that states in Europe faced. On the other hand, while there is a significant degree of internal cohesion, adaptability to outside security changes, which historically has strengthened the regime, threatens to weaken it. The CFE may not have the institutional strength, on its own, to withstand these pressures, and as such may play a reduced role in the future.

⁷⁴ "Russia Raises...", *Disarmament Diplomacy*, October-November 2002; Christine Kucia, "Baltics Deny Plan to Deploy NATO Nuclear Weapons," *Arms Control Today*, October 2002.

⁷⁵ Alexei Arbatov, "The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya," George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, No. 2,