J115(A80)

Proposal Abstract J115(A80)

1. Arms Control Problem:
Nuclear weapons - missile tests

2. Verification Type:

Remote sensors - aerial

- ELINT
- ground-based
- satellite
- shipboard

3. Source:

Scoville, Herbert Jr. "Verification of Soviet Strategic Missile Tests". In <u>Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception</u>, pp. 163-176. Edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.

See also: - "SALT Verification and Iran". Arms Control Today 9, no. 2 (February 1979).

4. Summary:

Scoville contends that during the test phase it is possible to obtain much detailed data on the nature of a new weapons system which might be concealed once it is deployed. There is, furthermore, a correlation between deployment and testing because strategic systems require extensive tests in a near operational configuration and conditions to acquire a reliable capability. The author reviews Soviet missile test sites and American resources for monitoring these sites.

Observations of Soviet missile tests are essential to verifying SALT II. The ABM, SALT I and SALT II Treaties all have provisions designed to assist verification. A summary of the more important provisions of this nature in SALT II is provided.

Scoville next assesses the US capability to monitor various provisions in the ABM and SALT II Treaties. He concludes that with a combination of available systems, the US can be confident that no undetected Soviet violation could significantly affect American security, in spite of the loss of intelligence collection sites in Iran.