

world we find an array of well-nigh overwhelming problems. It would be idle to suppose that at this session of the General Assembly we can bring about a settlement of all these controversies. We may hope, nevertheless, that our endeavours will serve to start a reversal in the trend of world events so that we may, as we are pledged to do under the Charter—"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". When those words were written, despite the appalling devastation which a global war had wrought, those at San Francisco in 1945 could not realize that soon means of destruction would be created which would make us uncertain that the world would ever see those succeeding generations. We have indeed a more fundamental task than that envisaged in the Charter—not merely to save the world from the scourge of war but to save the world from destruction.

As some representatives have rightly said, our debate in this assembly is not merely about disarmament, but about human survival. We have yet to prove that we are capable of the radical adjustment in our thinking which the modern age demands. We are still using, Mr. Chairman, the outworn vocabulary of international rivalry in the age of intercontinental missiles and the beginning of ventures into outer space. Modern science requires us to achieve a solidarity of purpose as human beings in the great venture of exploring these new developments in science for the benefit of mankind.

The Soviet Union makes a simple appeal—ban the use of nuclear weapons altogether, or for five years, and then eliminate them entirely. And, I must confess, in common with many others throughout the world, that this proposition has an immediate attraction and appeal. An end to any possibility of the use of nuclear weapons is certainly our objective. Why then, it is fair to ask, can we not now accept this simple appeal? The answer is that a promise not to use nuclear weapons is good only until one nation decides to break it. There is at present no reliable means of ensuring the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

A disarmament agreement must be based on something more substantial than mere promises. All nations must know (and be able to rely on that knowledge) that other nations will not continue to keep and develop such weapons in spite of their pledged word to get rid of them. We must be convinced that no nation is planning or preparing the destruction or crippling of another and each of the nations must, by its deeds and not by mere declarations, persuade the other nations of the world that its weapons will never be used except for defence. We must have mutual trust and confidence, but it must be based on the cold, hard terms of a binding agreement under which real safeguards have been established. If the nations of the world had the faith in one another on which moral obligations without such safeguards would have to depend, they would not now be caught in the dire armaments race.

Throughout the United Nations disarmament talks the URSS has been notably reluctant to come to grips with the question of inspection. Instead, they have frequently accused other countries of using arguments of inspection as an excuse for avoiding disarmament. We were considerably encouraged by the fact that at least in principle the Soviet attitude on controls in the last year or so had improved considerably, and I believe this was a major factor in the hopes during the past year that at least a partial disarmament agreement might be soon achieved. It was, therefore, with deep dismay that we heard in the latest Soviet pronouncement the same old contemptuous reference to the guarantees of inspection and control which mark the difference between empty declarations and serious disarmament undertakings.

I know that the deep suspicions which divide the great nations today make any agreement on inspection and controls slow and difficult, but countries which are genuinely peaceful in their intentions and whose armed forces and armaments are honestly defensive and not aggressive, should be able to accept this essential condition of disarmament. As my Prime Minister put it, "If you have nothing to hide, why hide it?" Canada, for example, has agreed to open its territory to whatever inspection may be mutually accepted by the parties to a disarmament agreement. We have explicitly agreed to aerial inspection of all or part of our country under a fair and equitable system for warning against surprise attack. Soviet spokesmen have rather sarcastically written off inspection of Canada's arctic regions (included in one of the zones suggested), but this area is of course significant in this context, both as a possible route of surprise attack and as an area for a beginning of such inspection which would be free of some of the complications of more heavily populated regions.

Even if we are agreed in principle on the necessity for controls, there are innumerable questions of technical detail which would need clarification and agreement. The