

he thinks requires a repetition of similar phenomena. Modern logic does not support this view; it would exclude an application of causation in history. The law of the determination of changes does not require either for its validity or applicability that the same changes be repeated. Historical facts, which do not repeat themselves, are understood by science, which involves not merely analysis, as Bergson seems to think, but synthesis as well. A fundamental error in his criticism of science is the assumption that intelligence is identical with mere analysis. In all scientific method analysis and synthesis go together, and, outside of pure mathematics, their results must be controlled and tested by observation and experiment. Even hypotheses, the dynamical factor in science which frequently result from what are called "intuitions" or imaginative combinations—doubtless due to the functioning of brain paths not yet understood—must be subjected to the test of facts if they are to be regarded as anything more than convenient fictions. Important additions to truth are sometimes suggested by intuitions, but unsupported "intuitions" are no guarantee of truth. The "synoptic grasp" is all the more adequate the more perfectly the preceding work of analysis has been done. M. Bergson overlooks all this. The superiority of the intuitive metaphysical method consists in its celerity. A favourite device of Bergson's is to assume that a given number of explanations exhausts all possible accounts of some group of natural phenomena, to point out difficulties in a certain number of these, and then assume that the remaining one, which he supports, is the sole explanation. He rarely sees any objections to his own hypotheses.

For Bergson's own peculiar doctrines of time, of change, and the freedom of the will it would be hard to find any basis either in fact or in the conditions of experience. His doctrine of freedom, if I understand it, is a surrender of the whole position, since one is freest at the vanishing point of cognition, and if you attempt to define what freedom means, you will, as Bergson pleasingly admits, inevitably find yourself committed