

markable field-day at Wimbledon-common last year, written by a noble lord commanding a brigade, whose better judgment appears to have been overruled, of which I will say no more than that it was not a representation, but a ridicule, of the realities of war. And that too, at a time when on account of events in Europe a display of such military inefficiency was to be regretted. It is apposite to observe here that the instruction of the Militia and Volunteers is the same as that of the Army. I now beg to adduce a few service examples of the unfavourable results of mistaken military education in the Crimea and India. As regards the Crimea, I do not wish to ring the changes on Balaklava. I will merely observe that although nothing could be greater than the devoted gallantry of the troops, yet that the charge with a brigade of cavalry, with the Fedurhino Heights with artillery and rifle men on their left line, and a masked battery to their right front, and a large force of all arms in front, was a thing never heard of before, and could only end in loss of most valuable life. Then, on account of neglect, ground and other rules for outposts, pickets and guards of trenches were only too often surprised and driven in. But in justice to a noble Earl I am happy to say that I was told by a very competent authority that he always evinced both zeal and ability, with the best results, in placing his outposts and sentries. Inkermann, though a great victory, was a surprise, which rendered a retirement necessary in the first instance and caused loss of life. In October, 1855—the day of the general and final attack on Sebastopol—Marshal Plessier sent me to tell the English Commander-in-Chief that the French had taken the Malakhoff, and to request the British to take the Redan. General Simpson requested me to tell the French Commander-in-Chief that his troops had been unable to take it. Now, my lords, the cause of this failure was an attack in one line without a second line in support. As regards India, the sieges of Delhi and Lucknow, two main operations of the insurgents, were both caused by misprison of strategy. If the commanders at military stations had by simple strategical arrangements prevented mutinous garrisons from leaving their stations, they would not have formed a nucleus at Delhi. The Siege of Lucknow was ushered in by the defeat of its garrison at the strong village of Churhut, one march from Lucknow, where they went to attack a large force of mutinous regiments. In disregard of strategical foresight, the left flank of the English troops was posted on the village, which was neither occupied nor watched. Fatal volleys at close range into the English left were the first intimation of the dangerous flank attack. It was followed by a retreat to Lucknow, with a loss of artillery, and the arrival of the enemy before the city as besiegers. An advance in light infantry order against a fort held by a few mutineers, without reconnoitering or a turning movement, was the cause of the check of one of the finest brigades of all arms that ever took the field in India, with a large loss, including that of a general officer of the highest promise. I now beg, my lords, to close my statement of deficiencies in our education and training for war, its causes and results. I regret the necessity which has compelled me to notice military failings, but I should have been guilty not only of false and culpable delicacy, but of the greatest dereliction of duty of which an officer can be capable if I had silenced convictions which told me British troops had already sustained reverses in consequence of mistaken training, and that for the same reason

they would certainly encounter fresh, perhaps irretrievable, disasters were they to take the field against an army perfected in the art of war. More especially when in the last few months we have witnessed one of the best and most successful armies in the world fall in collapse, not from any want of their proved gallantry, of which I have on so many occasions been witness, but from a neglected art of war. I think that when vast and cardinal changes are announced which point to a great evil, although that evil is not known by bad results, it may be an advantage to the Government and Parliament that they have now before them a plain statement of facts, proving the existence of our military shortcomings; and I venture to think that when your lordships have heard the simple remedies which I suggested to the Commission on Military Education, you will agree that they are as simple as the evil is palpable. I venture to think that another advantage of my statement is that it removes the impression which exists in some quarters that the blame of reverses I have alluded to attach to officers. The statement places the saddle on the right horse. A faulty education is alone to blame. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord concluded by moving that an humble address be presented to Her Majesty for returns of the number and statements of service of garri-on instructors, and copies of instructions given to them for the execution of their duties by the Secretary of State for War, as well as copies of any instructions given by him, or of communications made by the Royal Commission on the military education of officers of Her Majesty's Army, consequent on the Commissioners' report on that subject.

THE WIMBLEDON TEAM.

COMPETITION AMONG THE MARKSMEN.

The following are the scores made at the competition for selecting a team of marksmen, Ontario at the Wimbledon Rifle Tournament.

THE KINGSTON COMPETITION.

The complete results of the trial at this place have not come to hand. The result so far is as follows: At 400, 500, and 600 yards for the morning, and 500 and 600 yards for afternoon:

THE MORNING SHOOTING.

	200	500	600
	yds.	yds.	yds. T.Y.
Sergt. Lawrie, 45th Batt....	20	8	18-16
Sergt. J. Hunter, G.T.R. Batt....	17	18	13-18
Pl. Harries, do	10	22	25-01
Corp. J. Wilson, do	13	12	20-13
Pl. O'Neill, do	11	13	0-21
Pl. Wm. Rogers, 11th Batt....	12	7	11-30
Capt. Werner	20	21	17-03
Pl. Thos. Johnson	16	13	13-45
Sergt. R. G. Kincaid	21	18	18-03
Pl. Hunt	16	16	15-01
Sergt. M. Donnelly	18	12	12-12

AFTERNOON SHOOTING.

	500	600
	yds.	yds. T.Y.
Sergt. Lawrie	19	11-30
Sergt. J. Hunter	20	15-35
Pl. Harries	23	18-12
Corp. J. Wilson	22	15-37
Pl. O'Neill	11	11-25
Pl. W. Rogers	11	9-21
Capt. Werner	15	10-25
Pl. Thos. Johnson	14	11-23
Sergt. Kincaid	21	11-37
Pl. Hunt	21	25-17
Sergt. Donnelly	23	21-41

THE OTTAWA COMPETITION.

Capt. Cotton	206
Capt. Bell	196
Ensign McEwan	175
Sergt. Harris	215
Gunner Russell	201
Lieut. Patrick	203
Sergt. Wilkinson	205
Lieut. Walker	261

THE TORONTO COMPETITION.

Rank and Name.	200 yds.	500 yds.	600 yds.	Total.	Total of the 4 practices.
Sergt. McMullen, 10th	18	22	20	60	
Private Jennings, 10th	10	22	21	53	
Private Crookall, 10th	20	21	18	59	215
Ensign Burch, Q.O.R.	12	21	20	53	
Sergt. R. Durand, 13th	22	16	15	53	240
Private Sheppard, 13th	20	17	13	50	
Sergt. Byrne, 13th	22	23	13	58	235
Sergt. Bailey, 13th	20	18	17	55	
Corp. Sacke, Q.O.R.	20	22	16	58	233
Ensign Dillon, 34th	21	21	13	55	
Corp. Gibson, T. G. B.	19	25	16	60	227
Corp. Thompson, T. G. B.	20	25	17	62	220
Corp. Le Die, T. G. B.	21	17	25	63	222
Corp. Stevenson, 24th	18	22	13	53	
Corp. G. Durand, 20th	20	21	12	53	213
Lieut. Little, 13th	20	21	13	54	
Lieut. Marison, 13th	23	20	13	56	211
Lieut. Macdonald, 13th	16	18	15	49	
Private Thom, 13th	16	19	9	44	
Lieut. Richards, 13th	23	21	14	58	208
Lieut. Mason, 13th	22	21	16	59	197
Corp. White, 13th	17	15	15	47	
Private Adams, 13th	20	16	16	52	190
Private Oronhyateka, 40th Batt	11	12	13	36	
Ensign Wastie, 7th do	15	24	7	46	
S. M. Hiscott, 7th do	19	18	0	37	
Sergt. Dixon, 24th do	12	15	6	33	
Lieut. Chilmer, 22nd do	17	10	4	31	
Sergt. Luster, 24th do	12	15	6	33	
Sergt. Dalzell, 27th do	11	12	13	36	
Sergt. Hall, 27th do	17	10	4	31	
Capt. McClellan, 22nd do	15	24	7	46	
Private Jackson, 7th do	19	18	0	37	
Sergt. Elliott, 7th do	12	15	6	33	
Sergt. Backner, 22nd do	20	16	20	56	
Sergt. Cockburn, 35th do	21	17	13	51	
Ensign Laing, 7th do	21	17	13	51	
Lieut. McKeuzie, 7th do	21	17	13	51	
Sergt. Lucas, 24th do	21	17	13	51	
Sergt. Ticknor, 27th do	21	17	13	51	